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The subject of renegotiation is one of the most controversial aspects
of defense procurement today. The Administration, particularly the Depart-
ment of Defense, is in favor of renegotiation and has actively supported
continuance of renegotiation legislation before Congress. Industry, in
general, is opposed to renegotiation and has "been equally active in defend-
ing its position before Congress.
Renegotiation is an after-the-fact examination of a contractor's
profits and performance on all renegotiable business for a fiscal year. One
of the purposes of this examination is to secure fair prices for articles and
services which the Government must buy for defense purposes -while still main-
taining an incentive for the contractor to produce the materials at the
lovest cost by rewarding him with Increased profits for low-cost and effi-
cient production. The other purpose is to prevent individual contractors
from realizing unconscionable or excessive profits from the performance of
defense contracts.
Although a complete history of profit limitation is not attempted
in this paper, a brief synopsis of the various price and profit limitations
that have been used in attempts to control profiteering is included to
provide the background out of which renegotiation evolved. The first re-
negotiation legislation, the Renegotiation Act of 1942, attempted to
limit profits on a contract-by-contract basis. This method of renego-
tiation was found to present administrative difficulties and to be unfair
ii

to contractors. Subsequently, the Act vas modified to provide examination
of a contractor' 8 over-all profits for a fiscal year. Renegotiation has
followed this pattern ever since.
de wartime renegotiation legislation was permitted to expire in
19^-5 • In 19^ defense spendini?; began to increase and the Renegotiation Act
of 19^ > making certain contracts subject to renegotiation, was enacted.
IBtie coverage of renegotiation vas extended to most contracts made by certain
designated agencies and departsner.tfs by tbo renegotiation Act of 1951—the
statute in effect today.
In this paper I have presented a broad survey of renegotiation, of
the factors which led to its evolution, of its development through the years,
and an analysis of industry's criticisms of the process. In the final
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PROFITEERING AMD PROFIT CONTROLS PRIOR
TO WORLD WAR II
The history of the United States is replete with examples of fortunes
made through profiteering in times of strife. Mbet of the attempts to con-
trol and limit profiteering prior to World War II were made, with minor ex-
ceptions, by the executive "branch of the Government. Congress' role was one
of investigation and criticism.
Profiteering During Early Wars
During the Revolutionary War suppliers and contractors charged exorbi-
tant prices for food and clothing of poor quality. George Washington com-
plained in 1778 of ". . . those murderers of our cause (the monopolizers,
forestellers, and engrossers) ..." and felt that "no punishment in my opinion
is too great for the man who can build his greatness upon his Country *s
2
ruin." Although the Continental Congress was concerned about the costs of
war and military materials, its major reaction and only effort to prevent
profiteering were to recommend to the states that they limit profiteering.
Some of the states passed laws fixing prices, wages, and profits, but there
3
was no over-all profit limitation on an integrated national basis.
uf. S. Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on H.R.
3 and H.R. $293 3 Taking the Profits Out of War , 7^th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935,
p. 590.
TJ. S. Department of the Navy, liaVEXQS P-1995, Navy Contract Law (2d
ed., Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959)/ P» 253, n. 3»
3
-Tor an excellent and detailed account of early attempts to control war
profits see H. Struve Hensel and R. G. McClung, "Profit Limitations Prior to

2The Civil War again brought the subject of profiteering into the lime-
light. Fraud, corruption, and profiteering vere rampant in military procure-
k
ment. Congress did not regulate profiteering, but did enact some statutes
5
relating to bribery and other fraudulent practices. The concern over high
prices was limited to government contracts for military supplies. Conse-
quently, the burden of limiting costs fell on the executive branch, particu-
larly on the War and Navy Departments. The Secretary of War appointed a com-
mission to audit and adjust claims under contracts with the War Department.
This Commission secured deductions of $17>000,000 in the auditing and adjusting
of $50,000,000 in claims. The Navy Department consolidated the purchases of
vessels under one purchasing agent in an attempt to improve purchasing methods
7
and eliminate fraud. Congress in its investigative role appointed a special
committee to investigate procurement malpractices. The Committee reported in
I863 that they had discovered "... gigantic and shameless frauds on the
government . . .': and that the Conaiiittee was "... overwhelmed with aston-
ishment and sorrow by the revelations.''
After the Civil War, defense expenditures were negligible until the
Navy began a ship construction and expansion program in the 1860*8. During
the reconstruction period following the war, the administration, Congress, and
the citizenry were busy rebuilding the nation and the subject of profiteering
and wartime fraud faded from memory.
the Recent War," Law and Contemporary Problems (Autumn, 19^3), pp. 187-217
«
Navy Contract Law, op. cit ., p. 288. 5Ibid .
h
7,
Hearings on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293 » op. cit ., p. 592.
'Richards C. Osborn, The Renegotiation of War Profits , University of
Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research Bulletin No. 67 (Urbana:
University of Illinois, 19hQ ), p. 8.
8
Hearings on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293 * op. cit ., p. 593.

3In I897 Congress learned that the Wavy had been paying in excess of
$600 a ton for armor plate used in the construction of naval vessels. Believ-
ing this price to be unreasonable, it passed a law limiting the price to $300
a ton. The limit was raised to $400 a ton with the advent of the Spanish-
American War and the refusal of contractors to sell at the lower price. In
I899 the price was again reduced to $300 a ton. When it became evident that
manufacturers would not sell at this price, the Secretary of the Wavy was
given authority to buy at prices which in his judgment were reasonable and
9
equitable. This attempt at price fixing had resulted in failure. Profiteer-
ing during the Spaiii6h-American War was prevalent, particularly in the area of
10
ration procurement and the sale of contaminated beef. However, upon the
return to peacetime occupations, war activities and profiteering were
forgotten.
Price and Profit Controls
The onset of World War I again found the United States without a means
of controlling or limiting pAx>fits and prices. Price limitations are devoted
to keeping the costs of defense materials low—and may or may 110 b involve
profit limitation. Price controls are difficult to administer and, while
they may be acceptable during times of war, they are repugnant to the American
people during peace liii*}. In addition to keeping the costs of defense materials
low, price limitations have a secondary purpose of preventing inflation during
war—a period of increased personal financial resources and decreased avail-
ability of goods. Bernard Baruch testified before the War Policies Commission
in 1931 that inflation had greatly increased the cost of the war and multiplier
^Havy Contract Law, op. cit
., p.289j Osborn, op. cit ., p. 8.
1
Hearings on H.R. 3 and H.R. $293 > op. cit ., p. 598.

the "burdens on the back of generations to come. The World War I expendi-
tures of 39 billion dollars would have amounted to only 13 billion dollars in
terms of 1913 purchasing power and 15 billion dollars in terms of 1915 purchas-
12
ing power. Price controls, if universally and rigidly applied, are more
effective than profit limitations and excess profits taxes in keeping down the
costs of war, as prices must ultimately be based on the costs of production.
Profit limitations are primarily tfefl attempt at a solution to a morale
problem—-that is, their purpose is to prevent the realization of excessive and
unconscionable profits by manufacturers of war and defense materials; to pre-
vent a few from fflffrllriltlng themselves at the expense of the many in a way
detrimental to the welfare of the country. A secondary, and important, purpose
of profit limitations is to reduce the costs of defense materials and to keep
prices at a reasonable level.
Excess-profits; taxes were in effect during World War I. Taxes of this
type can be considered as being basically more of a revenue measure than a
limitation of prices or profits. Congress enacted a tax of 12=$ on profits
from the production of munitions in 1916 and an 8jl excess-profits tax in 1917*
Neither of these can be regarded as serious attempts to limit profits.
The 8$ excess-profits tax of 1917 "was subsequently replaced by the War
Revenue Act of 1917* which imposed rates of 20$ to 60$ on income above a
specified rate of return on investment.
The Bevenue Act of 191S imposed a war-profits tax on corporations at the
rate of 80$ of the excess of net income over the average pre-war income. While
not effective as a profit control measure, the act yielded substantial revenue.
Infra, p. 16.
"Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in the War (Uew York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 19^1), p. 381.

5Price and Profit Controls During World War I
Competitive "bidding was the primary procurement procedure in the pur-
chase of military and naval supplies during the years preceding World War 1,
With the rapid rise in prices in 1916 and 1917> competitive bidding soon had
to be abandoned because contractors refused to submit fixed price bids in the
face of the uncertainty of the costs of materials and labor. This led to the
use of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts, which were supplanted by
cost-plus -a-fixed-price contracts as the wastefulness of the cost-plus-a-
percentage-of-cost contracts became apparent.
During World War I three major types of attempts at profit limitation
were made: (l) Cost-plus contracts, (2) Excess-profits taxation, and
(3) Price fixing and control. The use of cost-plus contracts and excess-profits
taxes has already been mentioned. The effectiveness of these measures in con-
trolling profits will be developed.
To function in the area of price control and assignment of priorities,
Congress provided for establishment of a Council of national Defense in
August 1916. The Council was given only advisory powers and was specifically
charged with the coordination of industries and resources for the national
security and welfare, and with the creation of relations with industry which
would make possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization
of the resources of the nation. The Council created several administrations,
commissions, and boards, to carry out these functions. The rapidity with
which the subordinate groups were established caused confusion among the
groups as to their particular responsibilities and led to overlapping of
duties and jurisdiction. To cure these difficulties, the Council, in July
1917, created the War Industries Board to act as a coordinating agency. In





6of the Council of National Defense and made it an administrative agency
dii^ectly responsible to himself. Bernard M. Baruch was appointed as Chairman
of the reconstituted Board.
The War Industries Board through the use of a price-fixing committee
fixed, prices on a piecemeal basis, commodity by commodity, as expediency
dictated. Nearly all prices were fixed by negotiation and agreement between
the Government and the industries. The fixing of prices was not an over-all
procedure, but attempts were made to control the prices for foods, fuels, and
some raw materials. For these reasons the extent of price-fixing was some-
what circumscribed. In total, price fixing as practiced during World War I
neither limited profits nor controlled prices.
Failure of the Controls to Limit Prices or Profits
The numerous Congressional committees that investigated war profits
after the war demonstrated that none of the three methods used during World
War I effectively limited war profits. None of the methods provided an incen-
tive for a manufacturer or contractor to limit his costs or prices and profit
is the incentive in industrial activities.
A profit economy must attract manufacture of defense materials through
prospect of reasonable profits, for, as someone has said, patriotism is more
effective with a "slug of avarice." In a letter to the Nye Committee investi-
gating the munitions industry, Bernard Baruch wrote in 1935 *•
24ich as it may be decried, the cold fact remains that ours is
an economy motivated by profits. A certain return on money is
necessary to malie our industrial system work .... Much was said
at the hearing about this being a new war psychology .... Our
whole industrial system is a complex machine built and geared to
run on investment and profit. There is no proof that it will run
on psychology and there is much that it will not. Certainly we
should not select an hour when the enemy is at the gates to find

out whether it will or not. . . . Money trill not invest and
run the extreme risks of war for a fraction of 3 percent.
^
The emphasis during the war was on increasing production. She matter
of limiting costs and profits was secondary and subordinate to building up
the industries which manufactured war materials. While the three previously
mentioned methods of controlling profits and costs were utilized, none were
applied so stringently as to cause a possible curtailment of the production
of defense materials. Investigations, particularly post-war investigations,
showed that none of the methods had effectively limited war profits. One of
the first reports on the subject of profiteering was made by the Federal Trade
Commission in June 1918. The report stated that:
The Commission has reason to know that profiteering exists,
ttich of it is due to advantages taken of the necessities of the
times as evidenced, in tus war pressui*e for heavy production. Some
of it is attributable to inordinate greed and barefaced fraud.15
The reasons why the methods utilized dad not prevent excessive profits will
be developed in the £oxlowing discussion.
Cost-Pius Contracts
Cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts provide absolutely no incentive
for manufacturers to minimize costs and consequently to keep down prices and
limit inflation. This type of contract actually provides an incentive for the
contractor to maximize his costs to maximize his profits because his profit is
a percentage of the total cost incurred, and the greater the cost the greater
Ik
U. S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Investigation of the
Monitions Industry, Preliminary Rsport on Wartime Taxation and Price Control,
Report !*> 9kk-, ?&rt 2," 74th Gong., 1st Sess., 1935 > P» H* n. 10.
^Hearings on H.R. 3 and H.R. 529? j op. cit ., p. 605 • £ae Committee
print of the Hearings contains a reprint of the original, report of the Federal




the profit. As Eugene Mayer, Jr. put it: "Self-interest will dominate
altruism if the two motives are opposed instead of "being harmonized."
The amount of profit realized by a contractor under a cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee contract does not depend on the level of costs incurred in produc-
tion. Bierefore, there is not the incentive to reduce costs or increase the
efficiency of production as his amount of profit is not associated with these
factors
.
One major drawback in •the use or cost-plus contracts is the difficulty
of determining the RcbttSl cost of production by the contractor. A huge
policing and auditing ByVtttM is required to accomplish this task. In regard
to this aspect of cost-plus contracts, the Federal Trade Commission stated in
1913:
In cases where the government fixes a definite margin of
profit above costs, as in the case of flour, there is consid-
erable incentive to a fictitious enhancement of costs through
account juggling. rihis has added to the volume of unusual profits.
Increase of cost showing on the producers' books can be accom-
plished in various ways. The item of depreciation can be padded.
Officers' salaries can be increased. Interest on investments can
be Included in cost, ISsv construction can be recoiled as repairs.
Fictitious valuations on ray material can be added, and inven-
tories can be manipulated. ^
Any rigid profit limitation would operate too late to serve in keeping
down prices and checking inflation as the limitation would be applied only
after the payments, costs, and expenses of production had been met. This fact
alone would encourage a tendency toward increased costs and expenses, the pro-
motion of inefficiency, and vouid impede the procurement program. The limita-
tions in cost-plus contracts would serve only to decrease the amount of
apparent profit that a producer would receive and would not limit the cost of
Eugene Meyer, Jr., War Profiteering (Washington: 1917)> P» 6-
'Hearings on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293, op. cit ., p. 6o6.

9the product or limit the profits of subsidiary producers who manufacture the
components which are incorporated in the final product on vhich profits are
subject to the limitations in the contract.
Another difficulty vltt the rigid application of a percentage of cost
limitation is that it would be inequltaole between contractors operating under
different conditions. Different types of industries require varying amounts
of skill, capital, and work. Some use government furnished facilities, some
do not; some manufacture standard articles, some manufacture new and unique
products; some obtain capital from the government, some do not; some plants
are integrated, some are merely assembly plants; some industries require a
large amount of capital investment, some require a low level of capital in-
vestment; some have a high turnover, some have a low turnover; etc. Conse-
quently, it can be seen that a rigid percentage of cost limitation would be
inequitable between the various types of industries. Also, an efficient low-
cost producer is penalised, while an inefficient high-cost producer is
rewarded.
One of the problems of determining costs is the problem of allocating
expenses to either capital or revenue expenditures. As shown by the quotation
from the Federal Trade Commission report, this area provides a fertile field
18
for padding costs by recording capital asp«a£imr*fl as current expense.
When a contractor produces both commercial and government materials under a
rant -plus contract in the same naraifacturing facility, the problem of segre-
gating the costs attributable to the government manufacturing and the commer-
cial production must be solved. Even if the manufacturer has a good account-
ing system and the government has an efficient auditing group, the problems of
segregation and allocation defy easy solution, as the determination as to





matter of Judgment. Litigation over these problems Is time-consuming and
detrimental to efficient production by the manufacturer,
Price-Fixing
Price fixing also has defects when used primarily for the purpose of
controlling profits, particularly when the controls are applied in a piecemeal
fashion, as they were during World War I. In a time of national emergency, it
is imperative that all producers—even wWglaa3L ones;—be utilized in the pro-
duction of war- materials. Therefore, a price set high enough to provide an
incentive and a profit for marginal or high- cost producers to produce will
result in inordinately large profits for efficient, low- cost producers. The
Federal Trade Commission report on profiteering had the following to say about
19
the effectiveness of price-fixing in controlling profiteering: *
The outstanding revelation which accompanies the work of
cost (ladings is the heavy profits mode cy the low- cost con-
cern under a government fixed price for the whole country.
In the case of base metals, as in steel, when the government
announced a fixed price, it was made so high that it would
insure and stimulate production. This resulted in a wide range
of profits. Under the device of cost plus a margin of profit,
these profits are necessarily great in the case of the low- cost
mills. Thus, while the market was prevented from running away,
as it would have done undoubtedly if it had not been regulated
by a fixed price, the stronger factors in the industry are
further strengthened in theiivposition and enriched by profits
which are without precedent.
In addition, the fixing of prices alone does not insure against the
realization of excessive profits because many manufacturers who turned to the
production of war materials increased tueir level of production many fold with-




Hearings on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293 , op. cit ., p. oQ5«
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astronomical levels. The process whereby this increase in profits is realized,
even though prices are fixed, was demonstrate... to the War Policies Commission
21by Bernard Baruch.
Consider for example the simple case of a company capitalized
for $1,000,000, selling £1,000,000 worth of goods annually, making
20 percent gross profit or $200,000 on its turnover, and having
$100,000 of expenses of administration and selling, leaving a net
profit of $100,000 or 10 percent on both its normal turnover and
its capital. Suppose, also, that 10 per cent of its costs of manu-
facture or $300,000 are fixed overhead charges—depreciation,
maintenance, supervision, taxes, etc* Then its costs for material
and direct labor are $720,000 for every million dollars' worth of
goods it sells. How suppose that war comes and we need the full
capacity of that plant. Vfe give it orders for ^,000,000 worth of
goods to be delivered in a single year. It has no increased selling
and general administrative expense because tiie demand is so great no
such effort is required. Neither do the fixed overhead elements of
its manufacturing costs increase greatly-—say only to $90,000. What
happens to the profits of that plant? Its material and direct labor
costs on its $4,000,000 sales are $2,660,000. To this it must add
$90,000 for fixed overhead charges in its factory and $100,000 for
general and administrative expense, making a total cost of goods
sold of $3,070,000. Its net profit is therefore $930,000 or 930
percent of its normal profits in peace . It is making nearly 100
percent on its investment and its net profit on turnover has in-
creased from 10 percent to 23 percent. Even if we assess a tax of
80 percent on the $830,000 of excess over peace profit, that plant
will still be making $260,000 or £60 percent of its aorraal profits.
I want you particularly to note that this example considers no
increase in price whatever .
^
In order for price-fixing to function as an effective method of keep-
ing down the costs of war materials, it is necessary that the program of price
control be a complete one, that is, it must cover all commodities from the raw
materials through the finished product and it must include the control of
wages of all production personnel from the raw material stage through the
finished product. In short, price controls and wage controls would have to





3aruch, op. eix ., p. Klj.
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the production of a finished item. A system of this sort—in addition to
being repugnant to the American people, except during time of actual war—is
practically an administrative impossibility. Possi. M for evasion and
avoidance of adherence to price controls througia technicalities would be
numerous and the enforcement problems would be enormous.
As mentioned earlier, the prices mast be fixed at such a level as to
provide the profit incentive for producers. The experience of World War I
shows that if the producers are not assured of what in their opinion is a
reasonable profit, they will refuse to produce for the government. During
World War I the copper industry refused to produce at even the liberal prices
23
proposed by the government. The government had to partially meet the de-
mands of the copper industry aadl threaten uncooperative producers with the
statement that their mines and plant*, vould fei BOBMMteli if they refused
to cooperate. The steel Industry e!lrdXarly >v*f\i>,?t*»d to fill government orders
24
until prices bad been set at levels satisfactory to the industry. The
Du Port Company refu?ed to buXL4 a pCNfttr gftttact uktefe it alone was technically
qualified to build and operate until it was assured of what it considered
adequate profits.
Another factor that must be considered in the ir^piementation of a
price-fixing policy is titat governmental price-control agencies must largely
rely on induetry for their information as to corts, capacity, production
needs, and other fundamental information. In addition, the personnel of these
agencies must be made up of men who are inductrially trained and who usually
have a vested interest in private Industry. While not implying that these men
would deliberately and with profiteering intentions set prices at such a level






. , pp. 107-111.

13
as to assure industry excessive profits at the expense of the country, it is
necessary to recognize that such devices as formal severance and diacontinu-
ance of company compensation do not extinguish the real interest of an offi-
cial in his company. Furthermore., they will have «. tendency not to antagonize
businesB connections of long standing and from vhich future benefit can he
expected. These interests, plus the habits of thought and the personal
associations of men who have spent their lives in private enterprise, make for
a sympathetic attitude toward, industrial coioplaints and a willingness to rely
26
on information presented by the industry.
Setting prices at the costs of production plus a reasonable profit
presents another problem that isust be faced if a price- control system, is to be
effective. This would involve making future estimates of costs during a
period of inflationary pressures, placing enphasic on increasing the level of
production, and taking into consideration t&M ffeOBQS ©f manufacturers to
produce without being assured of reasonable profits. Bernard Baruch's plan
for the control of prices, talking cognisance of the ineffectiveness of the
wartime abortive piecemeal attempts to control prices, consists essentially of
freezing the upper level of prices at those in effect when war is declared,
and permitting the prices to fluctuate below this ceiling in accordance with
27
the laws of supply and demand. Then, in an area in which costs were too
great to permit the manufacturer to realize an adequate profit, the prices





'Baruch, op. cit ., passim; Cf. George P. Adams, Jr., Wartime Price





The excess-profits tax cannot be considered as a profit limiting
device, at it ikiuits neither profits nor costs. Primarily it is a source of
revenue; during World War I it was the largest source of revenue apart from
borrowing.
Ic is of course true that the tax rfettptttTti part or the profits, but
it does not per se limit profits. It does not provide an incentive for a
contractor or producer to hoid down costs and prices and, consequently, does
not serve as an anti- inflationary device. In fact, the excess-profits tax
provides an incentive for a producer to raise his prices so that he will have
greater receipts froia which he viil be able to retain profits after taxes.
Bernard Baruch demonstrates the existence of this incentive and how it
functions very effectively;
Sxcosa profits taxes-—standing alone—have no effect whatever
to check inflation . Their only effect is to increase it. Thus
20 per cent of $500,000 profit is $300,000 and 20 per cent of
$1,000,000 profit is ^200, 000. One way to increase .^00,000 piofit
to $1,000,000 profit without Increased risk or effort is to doubl«
price. For this reason there is more incentive to increase prices
—and therefore profits—under an o0 per cent excess profits tax
than there is without it. Indeed, the main result of such a system
Is to induce rapid price increase to absorb the tax. Precisely be-
cause it accelerates and in no wise checks inflation, the excess
profits tax—without ir»re—offers no cure at all for wax- evils.
On the contrary, it aggravates them.
Mr. Colver, who was Chairman of the Fedei'al Trade Commission during the war,
made the following statement:
. . . the way to make anything expensive is to tax it; and if
you -levy a tax on war, you ;nake war cost more than it should. A
study of the actual working out of our excess profits tax during
the last war will demonstrate beyond any possible question that it
did not recover the excess profits; that it did not keep prices
down, and that it did not stimulate production, but that on the
contrary it slowed production down, it stimulated prices, and it
2b
Baruch, op. cit ., p. 415.
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made the cost of the war to the taxpayers, I should say, twice
what it should have been. T vould say that for every dollar
collected in excess-profitc taxes that goo into the Treasury
it cost the people, of the United States, or it will cost them
$10 unnecessarily.^
"?he excor-^-orofitf? ttxm ftyrwwtfi us*8*! taring tterld War I were rigid
coonl* catod fbxwlM burtl on return on invoatofl capital and income on invest-
ed capital in e::ce?n of net incorno ovtr th* avrra^e pre-war income, and were
difficult to apply, much ler.r. enforce. Both formulae required determinations
as to what constituted invested capital, net income- and average pre-war in-
come. The identification and valuation of the items that constitute these
factors are elusive and dlfficilt to identify and. oewgrutah Litigation over
these taxen lasted into the early 19'30's.
The Senate investigating committee investigating the munitions indus-
try in 1935 came to the following two conclusions in regard to the use of
esr.ces? profits taxes as a profit eOKtfOl measure::
1. Severe war-tia*s taxation ensures the subjecting of the
administrative officials responsible for its operation to heavy
direct and indirect pressure for the alleviation of tax burdens,
it increases resistance to tax collection, and if it reaches a
level which the majority of businessmen feel is confiscatory,
will discourage or prevent the volume of production so essential
to the successful prosecution of a major war and thus defeat its
own ends.
2. Because of the difficulties of determining in any exact
manner the cost of all twyillKBl and hence the profits from busi-
ness and because of the ijapossibility of closing all loopholes
in legislation designed to apply uniformly to our immense and com-
plicated business and industrial structure, income taxation can-
not eliminate all war profits. 30
nj, S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Committee on Military
Affairs , 68th Cong., 1st Cess., 192^, p. 237; quoted in Senate Report Ho. 9kk,
Part 2, op. clt ., p. 9*
* Senate Report Ifo. 9^-j Part 2, op. cit ., p. 6.
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Reaction to World. War I Profiteering
After the war the investigators and political orators castigated those
who had "profitted from the slaughter." The puhlic was vocally critical of
those who had profited from the war and those who had permitted profiteering
to take place* One of the widespread claims that the war had produced 23,000
new millionnalres was repeated and amplified.* This statement was obviously
greatly exaggerated. An examination of the statistics of tax returns as
stated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue indicates very strongly that the
statement is false. However, the number of returns indicating personal in-
32
comes above $50,000 per year increased from 7>>09 in 1914 to 19,103 in 1917*
The subject of profiteering became a political football that was used by both
major political parties. Both parties gave their support in 1924 and again
in 192& to the prevailing sentiment for a survey of the whole gaiout of war
'JO
policies. After a few years of peace the public, in general, returned to
peacetime pursuits and problems and left the subject of excessive profits to
congressional committees.
She American Legion was particularly active in keeping the subject
before Congress and was instrumental in introducing several "bills to control
34profits. One of the major war profits investigating groups was the War
Policies Commission created pursuant to Public Resolution $Q, 71st Congress,
June 27, 1^30. The Commission was given the task 'to study and consider amend-
ing the Constitution of the United States to provide that private property may
31
Osbora, op. cit .j p. 4oj U. S., Congress, House, Committee on
Military Affairs , Preventing Profiteering in Time of War, and to Equalize the
Burdens of War"arid thus Provide for the tfetional Defense and Promote Peace ,




3d Sess., 'I93^,"p« T.
•* jfearinga on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293 1 op. cit. , p. 619.
"**TJ. S* Congress, House, Report of the War Policies Commission, House
Document Ho. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1931, p. viii.
•^Hearings on H.a. 3 and II. K. 52S6 j wp. cit ., pp. 9-37*
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"be taken by Congress for public use during var and methods of equalizing the
burdens and to remove the r>,- . of war, together vith a study of the policies
to be pursued in event of war." A formidable task indeedj The group was
comprised of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the IJavy, the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Attorney
Genei'sJ., tow: nuflM • tatc, and four from the House of Represen-
tatives .
The Commission reconraended that the Constitution be amended to permit
the taking of property for pub-J.e use, and to provide a contixxL of wartime
profits. It also recocEjended a tax that vouiu. uike away 95 percent of the
earnings of individuals ana corporations abo\re uiie average earnings for the
35prior three years. iione of the recammendatioiu; of the Commission were
adopted, l&unerous other committees continued to .investigate the subject of
excessive profita; ao legislation resulted from the investigations, although
all agreed that profits had been excessive. 5oth political parties were in
agreement that excessive profits had been realized by Government contractors
during the war, but they were unable to secure agreement as to methods to be
applied to equally distribute the burdens of war and to prevent the realiza-
tion of excessive profits. Some of the committees nu^*ested that 100 per-
cent of the profits from the war contracts should be taxed away. Others dis-
cussed the nationalization of industry during wartime. The only beneficial
legislation stemming from the mass of investigations was the outlawing of cost-
37plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts. The government continued to use com-
petitive bidding as the primary procurement procedure.
^J. S. War Policies Commission, Final Heport of the War Policies
Commission, March 5, 1932.
"^House Document It>. 163, Xoc. cit.
37
^'Osborn, op. cit., p. 9»

Vinson-Trammel Act and Merchant Marine Act
The first passage of peacetime profit controls came in 1934 with the
passage of the Vinson-Trammel Act. This lav was enacted to authorize the
expansion of the Navy and to provide for a limitation of profits on contracts
for the construction of naval vessels and naval aircraft. It stated that
profits on contracts for the construction of naval vescels and aircraft in
excess of $10,000 would be limited to 10 per cent of the contract price, and
that any profit*? above this limitation would be paid into the United States
Treasury.
The Vinson-Trammel Act was amended in June, 193v* to permit applica-
tion of the 10 per cent limitation to the aggregate contract prices for all
contracts completed within the taxable year, and to permit losses on some
contracts to be set off against profits realised on other contracts. In
addition, the ameadtaenk permitted losses for one taxable year to be offset
against net profits of the succeeding taxable year.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 extended the 10 per cent limitation on
4oprofits to contracts for ships built for the Maritime Commission. It also
included some provisions for the computation of costs. Ibr example, no mora
than $25,000 in annual salary for any individual could be counted as a cost
in the fulfillment of a ship construction contract.
In April, 1939 the Vinson-Trammel Act was further amended to be applicf
41
able also to contracts for Army aircraft. The profit limitation of 10
505.
^U. S., Congress, Public Law 135, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934; 46 stat.
39
-^U. 8., Congress, Public Law 804, ?4th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936; 49 giat.
1926.
'VC
\j. 3., Congress, Public Law 635, ?4th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936j 49 Stat,
19^5, 1993.




per cent, however, was restricted to contracts for naval vessels. A maxlmim
of 12 per cent of contract price was allowed for contracts for Army and Navy
aircraft. Losses on aircraft contracts were permitted to be carried forward
to the four succeeding taxable years.
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In June, 1940 the Vinson-Trammel Act was amended " to reduce the maxi-
mum allowable profits on naval vessels and Army and JJavy aircraft to 8 per
cent of the total aggregate prices of contracts completed within the taxable
year, or to 8.7 per cent of the total costs of performing such contracts,
whichever was lower, and limited the application 01* the Act to contracts
greater than $25*000. She reason for the decrease in the amount of profits
was that Congress felt that the lower limitation permitted sufficient profits
because of the increase in the level of procurement of ships and aircraft.
It was becoming evident that peacetime measures were not designed to cope with
increased wartime procurement. In September, 1940 the limitation on profits
from aircraft contracts was again raised to 12 per cent because of the in-
creasing reluctance of manufacturers to enter into contracts subject to the
43lower profit limitation.
Hindsight examination reveals that the Vinson-Trammel Act was not vary
effective in limiting profits, as the contracts let under the provisions of the
Act were essentially of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost type with all the
attendant disadvantages of this type of contract. It provided no real incen-
tives for the reduction of costs, the lowering of contract prices, or the in-
creasing of efficiency by the contractors . A Senate investigating committee
reported the following reaction by shipbuilders and associated contractors to
passage of the Act in 1934:
H0U S., Congress, Public Law 781, 76th Cong. 3d Se3s., 1940j 5* Stat.
676, 677.
U. S., Congress, Public Law 781, 76th Cong., 3d Soss., 1940; 54 Stat.
072, 333.

Various of the companies stated on the stand that they had
in no MQf oygtfdi Hi ; I ttU •
Very shortly after the bill was passed the shipbuilders and
the lar^e fugrpUttN ml 'rTavy MtatHftStWtMSVj and later the
comptrollers of these various groups, got together in long ses-
sions to determine hov the inte^retati.onn of the Mil could be
arranged to suit their interest. The main question was how to
increF.;?e costs. **
In regard to obtaining compliance with the provisions of the Act by an audit
of their accounting records, the report stated: "... there is absolutely no
effective control of costs possible without a huge policing system of auditors
and inspectors constantly on the premises
,
Contractors in 19^0 were reluctant to enter into government contracts,
particularly for the production of aircraft, because of the profit limitations
and the availability of more lucrative contracts for expanding foreign and
domestic marlcets which could be let without restraint or restriction. Hals
reluctance was delaying the defense program in its rapid build-up of the
armed forces. This is another respect in which it can be said that the Vinson-
Traramel Act was a failure in the attempt to walk the path between the realisa-
tion of excessive profits by contractors and the refusal of contractors to
produce.
The passage of the Second Revenue Act of 19^0 ' brought the imposition
of the first excess-profits tax. The profit limitations of the Vineon-Trammel
Act, as amended, were suspended on naval and military contracts whenever the
contractors and subcontractors were subject to the excess-profits tax, iSost oi
the limitations of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 were suspended under the
same conditions.
U« S.j, 0on£r48*j 8*airt*j Special Pumlt%M on Investigation of the
Monitions Industry, Preliminary Report on Naval Shipbuilding, 74th Cong., 1st




Public Law BOX, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., IS&O, 5^ Stat. 97^; 1003, 1004.

CHAPTER II
RENEGOTIATION 19^2 - 1950
The beginning of World War II again found the country without a plan
for an effective system for limiting war profits. It is true that Congress
had passed an excess-profits tax law in 19^-0; however, we have seen that an
excess-profits tax alone is not sufficient to insure the adequate pricing of
war materials or to insure that contractors do not make exorbitant profits.
Subsequent to the entry of the United States into World War II, statutes per-
taining to the establishment of price and wage controls, rationing, additional
excess-profits taxes, and the establishment of systems of priorities were
enacted. Since the effectiveness of these controls in limiting profits has
been discussed in Chapter I, the remainder of this paper will be devoted to a
discussion of the practice of renegotiation.
Prelude to Renegotiation
When the rate of military procurement began to increase rapidly, the
War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission introduced a system of
voluntary renegotiation. The contractors were asked to renegotiate, that is,
to agree to redetermine contract prices retroactively on a contract-by-contract
basis based on their production experience. Adequate pricing was one of the
greatest difficulties in the letting of war contracts. Some industries had to
convert to the production of items with which neither they nor the military
contracting officer had any experience. Other industries had to produce
articles in quantities much greater than they had ever visualized. Some

22
system or method was required vhich vould encourage production and reward
efficiency, but vhich would not allow excessive profits to accrue to the war
contractor.
05ie Second War Powers Act of 19^2, approved March 19^2> gave the
government the right to inspect the plants and audit the "books of contractors
who had contracts which had "been placed in furtherance of the war effort, and
also gave an agoncy acting under the provisions of the Act the right to aub-
poena witnesses, administer oaths, and, require the submission of records and
evidence. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the President, by Executive
p
Order 921? issued April 10, 19^2, designated the War Production Board; the
War, Navy, and Treasury Departments; the Reconstruction Finance Corporation;
and the Maritime Commission as governmental agencies to audit the boohs and
inspect the plants of defense contractors to prevent the realization of un-
reasonable profits. She War and Kavy Departments and the Maritime Commission
established cost-analysis sections and price adjustment boards to carry out
these functions. The cost-analysis sections were to act as fact finding
agencies for the price-adjustment boards which were to assist the departments
in obtaining voluntary adjustments or refunds from the contractors whenever
3
costs or piofits were considered to be excessive. Ene Executive Order stated
that the purpose of the administrative action va3 to control costs, to promote
efficiency, and to eliminate undue profits from hastily made contracts.
Congressional action to limit war profits was being considered con-
currently with these developments . Bie decision of the United States Supreme
"Hi. S., Congress, Title XIII, Public Law 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
19^2; 56 Stat. 165.
2
U. S. Federal Register , Volume VII, 1942, ^. 2753-27^.
"\f. S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation Relating to Renegotiation, Senate Document Ho. 126, 54th
Cong., 2d. Sess.,i9>b, pT 44.
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Court on February 16, 1942 that the Bethlehem Steel Corporation could retain
large World War I profits, because there had been no contractual arrangement
for the recoupment of excessive profits by the government, made it evident that
specific legislation would be necessary if excessive profits were to be denied
to government contractors. The Court stated this in the following words:
The problem of war profits is not new. In this country, every
war ve have engaged in has provided opportunities for profiteering
and they have been too often scandalously seized. See Hearings
before the House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293 #
74th Cong., 1st Sess., 590-596. To meet this recurrent evil, Congress
has at times taken various measures. It has authorized price-fixing.
It has placed a fixed limit on profits, or has recaptured high profits
through taxation. It has expresoly reserved for the Government the
right to cancel contracts after they have been made. Pursuant to
Congressional authority, the Government has requisitioned existing pro-
duction facilities or itself built and operated new ones to provide
needed war materials. It may be that one or seme or all of these
measures should be utilized more comprehensively, or that still other
measures must be devised. But if the Executive is in need of addi-
tional laws by which to protect the nation against war profiteering,
the Constitution has given to Congress, not to this Court, the power
to make them.
The Renegotiation Act of 1942
-
;
Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental l&tional Defense Appropriations
Act, 19^2, approved April 28, 1942—commonly referred to as The Renegotiation
Act of 1942—was the first legislation which pertained to the renegotiation of
excessive profits of defense contractors. The Act directed the Secretaries
of the War and Navy Departments, and the Chairman of the Maritime Commission,
to insert in any contract in excess of $100,000 a provision for the renegotia-
tion of the contract price at such periods as when, in the judgment of the
Secretary, the profits could be determined with reasonable certainty. Con-
tractors were required to insert the clause in subcontracts in excess of
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corpoi-ation 315 U.S. 269 (1942}.
%. S., Congress, Public Law 523, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942; 56 Stat.
226, 245-246.

$100,000. Bie term "renegotiation" included the refixing "by the Secretary
of the contract price. !Ihe Act further provided for the retention or repay-
ment of excessive profits when, in the opinion of the Secretary, "excessive
profits have been realised or are likely to Ixj realized." Ine profits re-
covered vere to be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. Ihe
Act was applicable to contracts, whether or not they contained the renegotia-
tion clause, on which final pa;vment hod not been made prior to the effective
date of the Act, April 26, 19^2. It was to remain in effect for the duration
of the war and for three years after* termination of the war.
Ihe authority to conduct renegotiation proceedings was vested in the
Secretaries of the War and Mavy Departments and the Chairman of the Maritime
Commission who were permitted to redelegate the authority to other agencies or
individuals, and. could authorise redelegaticn of the authority by these
agencies or individuals. Benegotiation was to be conducted on a contract-by-
contract basis; however, no guidelines were laid down to be used in determin-
ing whether profits were excessive except that the Secretaries were directed
not to make allowances for salaries, bonuses, or other compensation paid by a
contracting company to its officers and employees in excess of a reasonable
amount. XJor could they .ro^s allowances for ttog tvvces^ivo reserves eet up by
the contractor or for any costa incurred by the contractor which were excessive
or UH2*eaGonable. The gpMinrtfff wouia have the same right to require the sub-
mission of data and to conduct audits as delineated in the Second War Powers
Act.
An examination of tlio provisions of $Mi Act shows that it was intended
to accomplish two functions: (l) the adjustment of the contract price to an
amount which would have been considered iwllfMIMliln if cJ_L of the facts had
been known when the contract was let, and (2) the recapture of excessive
profits which had been realized in the performance of contracts with the three
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agencies. It should be noted that the Government had the unilateial
power to determine the access iventtts of profits. No provision was made for
the .Indicia! review of disagreements by aggrieved contractors.
Because of the vagueness and the newness of fche original Act, diffi-
culties in its administx-ation soon became apparent. The major difficulty was
the renegotiation of contracts on an individual or contract-by-contract basis.
To overcome this time-consuming and difficult practice, the departments began
to renegotiate contracts on a fiscal year basis, that is, all of the contracts
that a contractor completed within a fiscal year were renegotiated as a unit,
which emphasized the recapture aspects of the legislation more than the re-
pricing aspects.
6 7
The Renegotiation Act was amended on October 21, 1942; July 1, 19^3;
and July 14, 19^3 • '-2he provisions of the amendments were made effective
retroactive to April 2o, 1942, the date of approval of the original Act. The
amendments made the following changes in the Act:
1. The Act was extended to cover the contracts, and subcontracts there-
under, of the Treasury Department, the Defense Plant Corporation, the ifetala
Hearerve Company, the Defence .Supplies Corporation, and the Rubber Beserve
Company,
2. The meaning of the term "subcontract *' was clarified and was defined to
include all materials, machinery, services, and cocmiissions [above $25>Q00]
required in the performance of one of the contracts let by the designated
agencies
.
%. S., Congress, Title VIII, Bevenue Act of 1942, Public Law 753, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess., Iy42; 56 Stat. f^S, 9^2-9^5.
'U. S., Congress, Military Appropriation Act, 1944 , Public Law 103,
78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943 j 57 Stat. 347, 3*&.
o
U. S., Congress, Public Law 149, 78th Cong,, 1st Sess., 1943; 57 Stat,
564, 565.

3. The Secrets., ies of the agencies were given discretionary authority to
exempt any contracts performed beyond the continental limits of the United
States, any contracts ia which the pz*ofits could "be determined with reasonable
certainty when the contract price was established* and any contract in which
the provisions of the contract tNBVQ sdeijuate to gg'tiwml excessive profits.
k« 2hc Act specifically exacted from renegotiation any contracts with
foreign governments, other political subdivisions, and governmental agenciesj
and con-tracts for certain raw Materials whicii had not been processed beyond
the first stage suitable for industrial use.
5. Becovery of excessive profits could be accomplished by reductions in
contract prices, the withholding of amounts due, refunds by the contractor, or
by court action.
6. Final agreements could be made to cover past and future periods which
could not be reopened except for fraud or misrepresentation.
7« Costs and expenses of the character which the contractor was allowed
for tax purposes were to be recognized as exclusions or deductions for the
purpose of renegotiation.
. Benegotiation had to commence within one year after the filing of
financial statements by a contractor.
9. The contractor was to be allowed credit for Federal income and excess-
profits taxes in determination of the amount of excessive profits to bo
eliminated.
10. Henegotiation was to be conducted on an over-all fiscal-year basis,
thus implementing the administrative practices already in effect.
11. "Excessive profits : ' were defined as those found to be excessive as a
result of renegotiation.
She I&negotiation Act still did not provide guidelines or factors to
be considered in the determination of vhether or not profits were excessive.
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To fill tills gap, the War, Kavy, and Treasury Departments and the Maritime
Commission Issued a joint statement in March, 19^3 setting forth the general
principles followed In determining excessive profits, the particular factors
considered in the determination of excessive profits, aai the departments •
Interpretations of the statute. The particular factors considered in the deter-
mination of excessive profits by the price adjustment boards of the departments
included the following:
x. l<iauner in which a contractor's operations compared "with other con-
tractors with respect to the following factors:
a. Price reductions and comparative prices
b. Bfficiency in x"educing cotts
c. Economy in the use of MM materials
d. Efficiency in the use of facilities and the conservation of
manpower
o. Character and extent of subcontracting
f • Quality of production
g. Complexity of manufacturing technique
h. Bate of delivery and turnover
i. Inventive and developmental contrioutlon
j. Cooperation with the Government and other contractors in
developing end supplying technical assistance.
2. Risks assumed by a contractor such as:
a. Inexperience in new types of production
b. Delays from inability to obtain materials, rejections,
spoilage, and "cut-backs'' in quantities
c. Guarantees ox quality and performance
d. Seasonable pricing policies

3# Possible increasej in the coats of materials and wages.
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The trend of the emphasis in renegotiation away from its use, as a specific
repricing technique toward its use as a method of recapture of excessive
profits, while maintaining incentives in the form of a higher profit allowance
for efficient and economic production, can be ueen. The factors that were
considered in the determination of excessive profits were "based on the premise
of maintaining maximum productive output at the lowest possible cost. In order
to achieve this purpose, the contractor who contributed the most in the way of
cost reduction was rewarded vith a larger amount of profit than the inefficient
high-cost producer.
Beaction of Industry to aenegotiation
Richards C. Osborn summarizes the views of business groups on the
subject of renegotiation, as represented at congressional hearings, very
auccienctly:
In the press and in extended congressional hearings concern-
ing the extension of the 1942 Act, many business groups, large and
small, vociferously declared "this can't be done to us." They
lambasted the Act as wholly un-American, unconstitutional, unneces-
sary, ill-advised, or detrimental to the war effort and the economic
stability of the country. These and other businessmen prefaced
their remarks, however, with a statement that excessive profits
should not be made from the war. As a matter of ct^-ategy, tlieir
specific proposals dealt primarily with revisions that would emascu-
late the Act; they did net advocate its outright appeal. Each
industrial group considered itself to be a special case and sug-
gested amendments to the law which would reduce drastically or elim-
inate recoveries from their own profits.^
Q
U. S«, Department of War, Joint Statement by the War, Bavy and
Treasury Departments and the frjaritime Commission of Purposes, Policies^ and
Interpretations under Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental IitetIolS5rDefense
Appropriation'Xet, ± :j%2 t "as Amended ^(Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1943), p. 8.
10
Osborn, op. cit»> p. 19»
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It is difficult to estimate the proportion of all businesses with
defense contracts which opposed wartime renegotiation. Those opposing the Act
vere active and vociferous in their denunciation of the Act while those approv«
ing of the Act remained relatively silent. A post-war survey of businessmen
under the auspices of the National Industrial Conference Board showed that,
while businessmen were virtually unanimous in their opposition to peacetime
renegotiation, six out of ten businessmen indicated that they approved of
11
wartime renegotiation. Among the reasons given by businessmen for their
approval of wartime renegotiation were:
1. Renegotiation limitaiwar profits.
2. 'Ihe necessity of having war supplies at any cost, and, since the in-
experience of contractors with the production of war materials did not make
for efficient contract pricing, renegotiation made it possible to review
prices and. correct mistakes made in the haste of getting into production*
3. Renegotiation gave industry a "clean bill of health in the court of
public opinion" as far as profiteering was concerned.
4. About half of the industrialists who participated in the survey said
that the excess-profit& tax would have recar>ir.:.c-ed more tiiaa 70 per cent of
the renegotiation refunds, but that the tax alone iras not an adequate profit
control mechanism, because the contractor could have increased his profits by
raising his prices and thus benefitted himself to the detriment of his country
Specific objections of business groups to the Renegotiation Act of 19^2,
as amended, as voiced in congressional hearings, can be summarised as follows:
1* Renegotiation was time-consuming. It interf^-ed with the production
of war materials because experienced personnel and management had to devote
U.
national Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Bsnegotiation in Peace
and Iter , Studies in Business Policy Ifo. h** (new Xfcrfc: iJational Industrial
Conference Board, Inc., 1950), p. ii.
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time to the pxftfelMi of Hl'Mtf,il1>l.1m> that could have bMB better utilized
in production.
2. HHHJOtilt1CH U the sanctity of 9 •, Had .ituted
government lag HB '
>• ;"fcir*egotiation should tain place after the payment oi' income and MEM**
profits taiiks- Scaa busineosfflftn edttfce&M as vera a coct of business
ani should ho deducted ffron profile before renegotiat U
. Postwar and reconvertion Hm'WM V93N) not allowed as deductible items
of postfe ItWWH reserves in WdB—jy to finance Kbi conversion of produc-
tion fran a wartime "basis to the production of normal commercial articles.
5. The administration oi the Act was discretionary and arbitrary, lib
formula or fixed legal standards had "been established to "be used to determine
the excessiveness of profits. ihe avthodi and rule3 of the renegotiation
boards vore shrouded in mystery and a contractor did nob ktt9M how a hoard
arrived at its determination as to the portion of his profits that were
excessive.
5. Standard commercial articles should be exempted from renegotiation,
particularly those articles for which the Office of Price Administration had
established price ceilings. Vendors of services maintained that their profits
should be exempted from renegotiation.
i . renegotiation was a unilateral action, ina government could recap-
ture excessive profits, but the contractor was not reimbursed for losses
within a fiscal year, renegotiation was based on book-profit figures which
did not always indicate the long-term operating results of a business and the
Act did not provide for a carry-back or carry-forward of losses.
~. !Ehe Act created uncertainty in the determination of a company's finan-
cial position. A company was unable to have any definite knowledge of the
funds available to it to take care of normal corporate functions until after
the completion of the renegotiation proceedings*
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9* Dae administration of the Act created a hardship on small companies.
Die representatives of these organizations recommended that the minimum
aggregate of contract prices subject to renegotiation should be raised to
$500,000.
10. !2ne only appeal from a board decision vas to the appointing office of
the board. "Eas Act provided no redress in the form of appeal for .Judicial
review.
11. She very nature of the Act discouraged close pricing by government
procurement officers. Dae procurasaont officers had had enough experience to
adequately price contracts, thsraby preventing the realization of excessive
profits and permitting the termination of the renegotiation Act.
12. Die administi-ation of renegotiation did not encourage efficiency. It
vas not apparent to the contractors that efficient management and economical
production were being taken into account in determination of excessive profits
and therefore they felt that they did not have financial Incentives to pro-
duce efficiently.
13 • Each agency named in the Act had established its own price adjustment
boards and there was a lack of uniformity in the administrative policies
followed by these boards. In addition, companies were often renegotiated by
different boards in different years. Die representatives of these companies
felt that if they were renegotiated by the same board oach year that board
would become familiar with the peculiarities of that particular industry and
would be able to accomplirJi their function more efficiently without the neces-
12
slty of the industry's having to re-educate a new board each year.
V* 3., Congress, SflBfftj GQBBilt&M on Ways and MMKBftj hearings on









Senate Appraisal of Renegotiation
The Senate Special Committee Investigating the national Defense Pro-
gram reported that many war contractors had already recognized the reasons for
and the importance of tailoring their own profits to levels that were fair
13
"both to them and to the Government. It praised both the majority of the
contractors for their cooperation and the administrators of renegotiation for
the manner in which renegotiation was being conducted. However, the Committee
felt that the principles and results of renegotiation were shrouded in too
much seci'ecy, that duplication in the administration of the Act existed, and
that perhaps the reward for quality and efficiency of production was not being
stressed enough. It recommended an immediate unification of the price adjust-
ment "boards and the adoption and publication of uniform price adjustment
policies with emphasis on reward for efficient production, thus offering an
incentive for low-cost production. It further recommended that standard com-
mercial articles, on which costs had been accurately established, and certain
short-term contracts be exempted from renegotiation; that the $100,000 exemp-
tion be raised to $500,000; and that the contractors subject to renegotiation
be required to file copies of their income tax returns with the price adjust-
ment board. The administrators of the Act concurred in the recommendation
that the minimum amount of accruals subject to renegotiation be raised to
$500,000, because it would reduce their administrative burdens and because
they felt that most excessive profits were being realised by producers with
more than $500*000 annually on government business. They also concurred in
the recommendation that contractors subject to renegotiation file financial
data with the price adjustment boards in preference to the system then being
followed where the boards had to seek out the contractors subject to the Act*
13
nj. S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the IJationaL
Defense Program, Renegotiation of War Contracts , Senate Report Ho. 10, Part 5#
78th Cong., 1st Seas., 1°A2, pp. 2-4.
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The Renegotiation Act of 19^3
In response to some of the objections by contractors and the recommen-
dations of the administrators of renegotiation and the Senate Investigating
Committee, Congress approved the Renegotiation Act of 19*0 on Jfebruary 25,
lyhk,'
1
' The Act was applicable to fiscal jptflBW ending af ter June 30, 19^3 and
vas scheduled to expire December 31, 19^, unless extended by the President to
the termination of hostilities
.
The Renegotiation Act of 19^ emphasized the fact that renegotiation
was primarily a process for the recapture of excessive profits. One definite
change in renegotiation vas the divorce of contract repricing from the re-
capture of excessive profits. The department, | - yLlttNB t&i authority to
reprice their contracts apart from the xenegotiation process, either by
agreement with the contractor or by a unilateral uiuation of what con-
15
stituted a reasonable price*
While the Act constituted a complete pf viaion or restatement of the
procedures and principles of renegotiation, the primary changes were proce-
dural in nature and did not constitute aitei-ations of the basic principles
set forth in the earlier legislation. One of the main innovations under the
new law was the creation of a War Contracts Price Adjustment board in which
was vested the authority and responsibility for the conduct of renegotiation
and the establishment of uniform policies and procedures, The Board con-
sisted of six members—one representing the Department of War, one the Depart-
ment of -toe Mavy, one the Department of the Treasury, one the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, one the War Production Board, and one the u&ritime Com-
mission and the War Shipping Administration. The Board was authorized to
delegate any part of its powers or functions to the Secretary of a Department
who was authorized the power of redelegution.
Ik
U. S., Congress, Title VTI, Revenue Act of 19^3 , Public Law 235,
78th Cong., 2d Sess., 19^+3; 5<3 Stat. 21, 7^-92.
15
Ibid., Title VIII, 58 Stat. 21, 92.
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The criticism by industry of the arbitrariness of the determination
of what constituted excessive profits vas answered by providing that the
following factors be taken into consideration in the determination of the
amount of excessive profits:
1. efficiency of contractor, with particular regard to attainment of
quality and quantity production, reduction of coats and economy in the use of
materials, facilities, and manpower;
2. reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard to volume
of production, normal pre-war earnings, and comparison of war and peacetime
products;
3* amount and source of public and private capital employed and net
worth;
1*. extent of risk assumed, including risk incident to reasonable pricing
policies;
5. nature and extent of contribution to the war effort, including in-
ventive and developmental contribution and cooperation with the Government
and other contractors in supplying technical assistance;
6. character of business, including complexity of manufacturing tech-
niques, character and extent of subcontracting, and rate of turnover;
7. such other factors the consideration of which the public interest and
fair and equitable dealing may require, which factors shall be published in
the regulations of the Board from time to time.
The Board was rc-quired to furnish the contractor with a statement of
the facts used as a basis for the determination of excessive profits if the
contractor requested it.
The Act provided that any contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by a
unilateral determination of excessive profits by the Board could appeal to the
Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination. The proceeding before
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the Tax Court was to be a proceeding de novo and the Court could find an
amount of excessive profits less than, equal to, or greater than the amount
determined by the Board.
Whereas the earlier arnendrorntf:. to tht lyk2 Act had stated that costs
and expenses of the character the contractor was allowed for deductions for
tax purposes should be recognized as deductions for the purpose of renegotia-
tion,, the 19^3 Act stated that deductions allowed for tax purposes would be
allowed as deductions for renegotiation insofar as they were attributed to
renegotiable business. In addition, if amortization was recomputed at an
accelerated rate, the contractor could be given a rebate for refunds made in
prior years, if the recommutation showed that he had been given insufficient
credit for amortisation.
The statute required a mandatory filing by the contractor with the
Board of an annual statement in such form and detail as the Board prescribed.
The renegotiation clause was still to be inserted in all contracts
and subcontracts in excess of $>10Q,000, except for those for the solicitation
or procurement of government contracts or subcontracts thereunder, in which
cases the clause was to be inserted if they were in excess of $25,000. How-
ever, the minimum aggregate amount of receipts and accruals during a fiscal
year from the performance of defense contracts and subcontracts subject to
renegotiation was raised from $100,000 to $500,000, except for commission
contracts which remained subject to renegotiation if the aggregate receipts
were in excess of $25,000.
In addition to the exemptions set forth in the amendments to the 19^2
Act, the 19^3 Act mandatorily exempted from renegotiation: (1) contracts for
agricultural commodities in the raw or natural state, or in the first form In
which customarily sold, (2) contracts with tax exempt institutions, (3) con-
struction contracts awarded as a result of competitive bidding, and (4) any

ysubcontracts for items mandatorIV exempted. The Board was also given
discretionary authority to exempt any contracts for standard commercial
articles; contracts which in the opinion of the Board were not administra-
tively feasible to renegotiate, individually or hy classes or types; and con-
tracts which were lift under rompotitive conditio vej-e likely to
result in effective competition with respect to the contract price. The
profits realized from increases in inventory value were also exempted from
renegotiation.
The amendments pertaining to the reaanputation of amortisation, the
exemption of contracts for agircultural commodities and with tax exempt in-
stitutions, a cost allowance for integrated producers, the exclusion of in-
ventory profits, and the right of appeal to the Tax Court were made retro-
active to April 26, 19^2, the date of the passage of the original Act. The
provision pertaining to the establishment of the War Contracts Price Ad.just-
ment Board was mads effective a« of the date of the passage of the Act
—
February 25, 19kk—and the remainder of the Act was made effective as of
July 1, %$k}*
Reaction of Industry to the 1^-3 Act
ihe objections to the ^negotiation Act of l$kj by the vocal elements
in industry did not differ substantially from the objections to the 1942 Act.
Some businessmen felt that renegotiation was in practice nothing more than a
:
' super 100 per cent excess-profits tax :i and that production efficiency was
not being adequately rewarded. Contractors maintained that even with the
delineation of the statutory factors to be considered in determining exces-
sive profits, the bases of the findings of the boards were still a mystery to
contractors who deserved to know how the boards arrived at their determina-
tions. Contractors who had a small percentage of invested private capital as
compared to government furnished facilities felt that the net worth factor was
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overemphasized, and the contractors vho had large amounts of private capital
felt that net worth was underemphaslzed by the boards in arriving at their
determinations of reasonable profits. Some felt that greater consideration
should have been given to turnover when evaluating the performance of a highly
integrated contractor who had a large opex-atiu^: investment and a low rate of
turnover. Industrial groups were still attempting to obtain special conces-
sions for their industries*
i
Extensions of the Act
The Act was extended to remain in effect until June 30, 19^5 by
16
Presidential Proclaimtion 26^1 on Movaaber Ik, l$m# The proclamation
stated that the reason tor extension of the termination date was that com-
petitive conditions had not bean restored as of that date. On June 30, 19^5
17
the termination date wa3 extended, by amendment, to the date of the termina-
tion of hostilities, or December 31, 19^5* whichever was earlier. The Act
expired on December 31, 19^5 and profits attributable to the performance of
contracts subsequent to that date were not subject to renegotiation. The
profit limitations of the Vinson-Trammel Act and the ^terchant Murine Act of
1936 again became effective vith the eviration of the itenegotiatlon Act.
Itesults of Renegotiation
The dollar amount of fixed-price and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee supply con-
tracts for corporations subject to renegotiation from I9-J-2 through 19k-} was
$223jH3>777>000, excluding brokers, agents, sales engineers, construction
°U. 3. Federal Register, Volume IX, I9M)., p. 13,739*
17




contractors, shipping contractors under charter, and contractors renegotiated
1
1
on a completed contract basis. The data for these items and tor contracts
with proprietorships and partnerships vers WBtVT compiled by the Board. Gross
recoveries of excessive profits by renegotiation amounted to £11,026,641,000,
v>, 770,124,000 of which vac attributable to fixed price end cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee supply contracts with eorpexe&Uuttfe and |l,^6,517#000 of which was
attributable to all other e - ;xi renegotiation* Of the amount
of gross recoveries, 56 per em LA have 'been recovered by taxes. After
allowance for tat ore la this amount, total '•BOWS lea u.vV.r • •es.tt-gotiation
amounted to $'-<,:J5i,722,040. Adainitftr»tiv« costs of ta« eoastuot of renegotia-
tion vera stated by f ^ntracts Price A&j- , Board to have o9ea
$41, 476,000—less than one per cent of the total amount of net recoveries.
It must be remembered that renegotiau'-ou ii not a revenue measure.
Although the amount i/eeewro* in dollars la greet - small percentage of
total -jar expenditure** Jhe impact of renegotiation on cost reduction and
pricing policies cannot be ms&iiured, and it is 'these it^aas which measure the
effectiveness of renegotiation. She aggregate of voluntary refunds, paler to
a company's renegotiation, and savings resulting from reduced prices are not
even approximator measurable. An estimate has been made -hat price inductions
in the amount of 4«i/2 bill-.o,u dollars were brought about because of informa-
tion obtained from renegotiation and the independent actions of contracting
19
official*;. "fhe War Department reported that renegotiation contributed to
18
U. S., War Contracts Price .Adjustment Board, Final Beport of War.
Contracts Adjustment Board, May 22, 1951*
19
'U. S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee 'to Investigate the
national Defense Program, Itenegotlation, Senate Heport Ho* 440, Part 2,
30th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, p. 5*
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resisting the Inflationary trend and had a tendency to control the pricing
20
policies of contractors. An example of the impact of renegotiation is
given in one of the Truman Committee reports:
One illustration of sach a company Is one of our largest air-
craft buU4*n (USlttd Aircraft Corporation of Bast Hartford, Conn.),
whose management luwo ttfHKD the attitude that they uj not wish to
profit inordinatel" from tho \ I IllWIlllhllUllJ increased voluxue of war
"business. Too result iii that the executives of that company have
cosse into tbi Pric; est! .i-oard ptrtflHIlWilly every fov months
and have suhmittod the figures SO their cgp nut for the few months
Jaasediately preceding, together with an offer of a volxintary -<:*efund
of such part of 'their profits as wrfi &MMA excessive. The refunds
made in thin manner hy t j corporation during tee years 19^1j
l£i)2, and 19^3 have aggregated ann tliar ,000,000.
Si corporate executive i dtt voluntary refund
of $286,000,000 o wama% if bt -new tnat his competitor
would be permitted tc iBMp 00^5.^)!^ pro. Lota +0 ruin
him when real cojnpetition U rtowtft ac the end of the war.
Shortcomings of 'Ay/Id ,,'ar II xienegotiation
The Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program,
while concurring in the conclusion that renegotiation load been effective in
liaiitiag var proiits anu obtaining better pricing policies, reported that
blatloa and its adiainistration had had several weak points which should
be rectified in any future renegotiation law.""' She Committee found that the
renegotiation officials had given insufficient weight to the factor of net
worth in considering wnat constituted a reasonable profit. The emphasis
seemed to have been on total volume of sales with the result that many
wliich started the MS wxth a small capital investment were permitted




u. B*j Cot-Z- lOfcfctj a&t&fl investigating the national
Defense program, Bairfl Axauml Beport, 9 art 1-, 7^th
Cong,, 2d Bm**) l$W9 p. :J.
*n&niAt f*v art -, op. ci.t., k». 7-12.
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within very small limits for manufacturers of similar articles, a practice
which did not sufficiently penalize high-cost, ineff icient contiactors, or
rewaid low-cost, efficient contractors.
The Committee also felt that the exemption of $500,000 of busineaa
from renegotiation permitted small concerns to real ize excessive profits . A
group of thirteen companies selected at random in the $100,000 to V500,0GQ
bracket during 19^3 f and therefore not subject to renegotiation, were found to
have had average profits of over 3^ per cent of g>x>ss sales,
Etie Bmndatory exemptions from •'©negotiation specified in the Acts also
permitted the accumulation of excessive profitc. The renegotiation officials
agreed with this impression and also recommended that permissive exemptions
he eliminated, from asy future Act. 2b.ey felt that both mandatoiy and per-
missive exemptions were unjustified, made renegotiation more difficult, and
were unequitable and. demoralizing to other contractors who had not been
exempted.
Certificates of necessity which permitted rapid amortization of new
war production facilities were one source of considerable profiteering. She
certificates permitted the holders to amortize the coat of the facilities over
a period of five years or less if the period of emergency was declared over
prior to the end of the five year period. Sne use of the certificates per-
mitted, companies to corns out of +he var with new, fully amortized equipment.
Ehe Committee also felt that some government contractors made large
profits out of defense-end items which were procured by dapartueuts and agen-
cies whose contracts were not subject to renegotiation. It recommended that
all government contracts which were made for the purpose of national defense
be made subject to renegotiation during vartlrae.

to
Ohe flmagotiation Act of ±9^>
H3ie only profit notations in effect from January 1, 19*4-6 to May 21,
1946 were the fixed porcentac® limitations of the Yinson-Trammel Act and the
Merchant Marine Act. On May 21, 19*$ in connect- -th increased defense
spending, particular 1/ tftt txpftaoloa of tho Ai.. Itorc^, Co^ress passed the
23
aenogotiation Act of I 2he Act stipulated that all contracts and sub-
contracts in excess of $1,000 that obligated ... . i^ions of or were entered
Into uadar contract aa ionizations of tha Supplemental national Defense
Appropriations Act, 19^6—appropriations primarily for the procurement of
aircraft and related facilities and equipment— liouli contain a clause irmfrlng
them subject to renegotiation. 'Sue aggregate of receipts from these contracts
had to total $100,000 **t?ore a contractor or ^ubcyjntracbor was subject to
renegotiation. Ihe Act laade trie Secretary'1 of Defense responsible for the ad-
ministration of renegotiation, gave him the gi -f delegation of authority,
and directed that he administer the Act in accordance with the procedures and
provisions of "the '^negotiation Act of 19^3. - also directed the
Secretary of Defense to promulgate and publish regulation jtote^preting and
applying the Act and to prescribe standards and procedure determining
and el&Binating excessivc profits.
About a month lo.ter, on June 25, 3£fe8| CbBgref iirected the Secretary
of Defense to direct the insertion of the renegotiation clause in any con-
tracts of the iiilitar," dqpftrtMBta for the procurement of ships, aircraft,
aircraft parte, am for the construction of facilities or installations out-
aide the continental United States which obligated any funds made available £>r
,
ok
ebligat > the fiscal year 1$'\9.~
23
U. S., Congress, Section 3> Supplemental national Defense Appropriar
tjon Act, 19^3 1 Publie Law 5^7, ^Oth Cong., 2d Sess./'i^; 'o2 Stat. 25^, 259-
2ol7~
" U. 3., Congress, Section 401, Second Deficiency Appropriation Act,
19*#
»
Public Law 7^5, Both Cong., 2d Sess., 1946 1 62 Stat. 1027; 1049, 1050.

iff
Subsequent appropriation Acts xaade the Ifenegotiation Act of 19^
applicable to all negotiated contracts , and subcontracts thereunder^ vhich
2*5 2-j
obligated funds during the years 1950 ^ and 1951.
^U. S., Congress, Section 622, national Military Establiahaaant Appro-
priation Act, 1950 , Public La&r 43^, 8lst Q«g., let Sess. ? 19*9; & Stat.
937, 1021.
^J. S., Congress, Section 618, Chapter X, Defense Appropriation Act,
1951* General Appropriation Act 1951> Public Lasr 759, 61st Cong., 2d See:;.
,
*% 6if Stat. 595/730, 754.

CHAPTER III
THE RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951
The Basic Act
In response to the increase in defense spending occasioned "by the out-
break of the Korean War in June 1950, the House Committee on Ways and Means
began holding hearings in August 1950 on a bill, introduced by Representative
Carl Vinson, to provide for extension of renegotiations to cover all defense
1
contracts. Representative Vinson stated that in his opinion the partial
applicability of the 1948 Act was not sufficient or bread enough to prevent
the realization of excessive profits or to hold prices down. Subsequent to
unanimous approval of the bill lay the House, and public hearings by the
HI
3
2Senate Committee on Finance in January 1951 > Congress enacted the Renegotia-
tion Act of 1951 on March 27, 1951.-
The Act for the first time set forth the policy on which a renegotia-
tion Act was based. Section 101 of the Act states:
It is hereby recognized and declared that the Congress has
made available for the execution of the national defense program
extensive funds, by appropriation and otherwise, for the procure-
ment of property, processes, and services, and for the construction
"TJ. S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on H»R.
9246, A Bill to Provide for the Renegotiation of Contracts, and for Other Pur-
poses, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess, 1950.
u. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on H.R. 1724,
An Act to Provide for the Renegotiation of Contracts, and for Other Purposes,
52d. Cong., 1st Sess., 1951 •
^U. S. Congress, Public Law 9, 82d. Cong., 1st Sess., 1951> 65 Stat. 7.
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of facilities necessary for the rational defense; that sound execu-
tion of the national defense program requires the elimination of
excessive profits from contracts made with the United States, and
from related subcontracts , in the course of said program; and that
the considered policy of the Congress, in the interests of national
defense and tie general welfare of the nation, requires that such
excessive profits be eliminated as provided in this title.
Hxe Act was made effective as of January 1, 1951 and all amounts re-
ceived or accrued from the performance of the contracts designated in the Act
vere subject to the provisions of the Act. It also made provision for the
completion of uncompleted 1^4d Act proceedings by the new Board established by
the Act. Bae termination date of the Act was December 31* 1953*
She Act, with a few changes, was based almost entirely on the 19^3
Act, as amended. She agencies whose contracts, and subcontracts thereunder,
were subject to renegotiation under the basic Act were the Department of
Defense: the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Farce; the Department of
Commerce; the General Services Administration; the Atomic Energy Commission;
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the Canal Zone Government; the Panama
Canal Company; the Rousing and Home Finance Agency; and such other agencies of
the Government exercising functions having a direct and immediate connection
with the national defense as the President desired to designate. Excessive
profits were to be determined with respect to the amounts received or accrued
by a contractor under renegotiable contracts or subcontracts in an entire
fiscal year of the contractor. One renegotiable floor (i.e., the minimum
aggregate of receipts or accruals by a contractor during a fiscal year) was set
at $250,000, except for subcontractors whose compensation was received in the
form of commissions—agents, brokers, etc.—for whom the floor was set at
$25,000. She statutory factors to be considered in the determination of ex-
cessive profits, although worded slightly differently, were the same as those







purpose* were to be allowed in renegotiation to the extent allocable to
renegotiable business.
Oiie Secretary of each named department was directed to insert in each
contract made by his department a clause statins that the contractor agreed
to the renegotiation of his profits and agreed to insert the clause in each
subcontract let in the performance of the prime contract, The insertion of
the clause did not necessarily mean that such contract or subcontract vould
be renegotiated nor did the omission of the clause preclude the applicability
of the renegotiation statute.
She 1951 Act differed from the 19^3 Act in two major respects. In-
stead of putting the administration of the Renegotiation Act under depart-
ments vhose contracts and subcontracts were subject to renegotiation, the Act
established an independent Renegotiation Board which carries out the provision! i
of the Act through Regional Boards, The Statutory Board consists of five men
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
She Secretaries of the Army, Ifavy, and Air Jorce, subject to approval of the
Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of General Services, were each
given the privilege of recommending to the President one person from civilian
life to serve as a member of the Board. Bae President designates one of the
members to serve as Chairman of the Board.
She other innovation in a renegotiation statute was the provision for
a one-year loss carry-forward in the determination of excessive profits* A
loss sustained by a contractor in one year was to be applied as an item of
cost in the next succeeding fiscal year.
Hot all contracts of the named agencies were made subject to renego-
tiation. The Act provides for the statutory mandatory exemption of certain
types of contracts from renegotiation and also permits the Board to exempt
some types of contracts from the provisions of the Act under certain circum-
stances. The mandatory exemptions in the Act, before amendment, were:

M
1. Contracts with political units and their subdivisions and with,
foreign governments.
2« Contracts and subcontracts for raw agricultural commodities.
3* Contracts and subcontracts for timber and minerals not processed "be-
yond the first state suitable for industrial use.
k. Contracts and subcontracts vitb regulated common carriers and public
utilities.
5. Contracts and subcontracts with tax-exempt organizations*
6. Contracts and subcontracts which the Board determined not to have a
direct and immediate connection with national defense.
7» Any subcontracts under exempt contracts or subcontracts.
8. Subcontracts for new durable productive equipment, except to the
extent of that part of the sales price which bears the same ratio to the total
price as five years bears to the average useful life of such equipment. Tor
example, if such equipment has an expected life of fifteen years, five-fifteen-
ths of the sales price would be renegotiable..
Bie Renegotiation Board was authorized, at its discretion, to exempt
the following contracts from renegotiation:
1. Contracts and subcontracts to be performed outside the continental
limits of the United States or in Alaska.
2. Contracts or subcontracts under which the profits could be determined
with reasonable certainty when the contract price was established.
3* Contracts and subcontracts with provisions which the Board considered
adequate to prevent excessive profits.
4. Contracts and subcontracts whose renegotiation would Jeopardise
secrecy required in the public interest.
5. Subcontracts when it was not administratively feasible to segregate




As in the 19^3 Act, contractors aggrieved by an order of the Board
nay file a petition with the Tax Court of the United States for a redetermin-
ation in a proceeding de novo . 35ie determination of the Sax Court of the
anount of excessive profits, if any, is final*
Amendment and Extension of the Act
Congress aitonded the Act and extended it for one year~-from January 1,
195k to December 31, 195^—on September i, 195*+ • 2ne minimum amount subject
to renegotiation, except for commissions, "was raised from $250,000 to $500,000.
A new mandatory exemption for standard commercial articles was added. Con-
tracts and subcontracts for standard commercial articles that met certain
qualifications and which were approved by the Board were exempted from rene-
gotiation. She contractor was required to file txa. application for exemption
with the Board stating that the articles he mamifactured met the qualifica-
tions necessary for exemption- For an article to be classified as a standard
commercial article it had to be manufactured for stock and customarily main-
tained in stock by a manufacfeurer or dealer, or it had to be manufactured and
sold by more than two persons for general civilian Industrial or commercial
use, or be Identical in every material respect with an article so manufactured
or sold.
An amendment also provided that contracts for the furnishing of sup-
plies or materials for the manufacture of synthetic rubber for nondefense pur-
poses were mandatorially exempt from renegotiation,. 2his amendment was
adopted because the ^construction Finance Corporation, one of the agencies
designated in the Act, manufactured synthetic rubber for sale to private
companies*
She partial mandatory exemption for subcontracts for new durable
productive equipment was extended to cover prime contracts as well as sub-
contracts.
- 5u. S., Congress, Public Law '{6k, 6*3d Cong., &a Seas., 195^; 68 Stat,
lllo.

On August 3> 1955 the Act vats amended and extended until December 31>
1956. The exaction that applied to contracts for standard eonnorclal
articles vas extended to cover contracts for standard commercial services. 2b
be eligible for the standard commercial service exemption, a service had to
be one that vas customarily performed by more than two persons for general
civilian industrial or commercial requirements or vas reasonably comparable
vith a service so performed. Application for exemption had to be made to the
Board in the same manner as application for standard commercial article exemp-
tion.
Contracts for the construction of any building, structure, improvement,
or facility were made mandatorially exempt if the contracts had been avarded
as a result of competitive bidding and were not financed vith a mortgage
insured under the provisions of Title VHI of the national Housing Act.
The statute also directed the Joint Committee on Internal itevsnuo
Taxation to make a complete study of the Renegotiation Act and whether there
vas any necessity for further extension of the Act beyond December 31, 1956.
She Joint Committee vas directed to report the results of the study not later
than May 31, 1956.
The Joint Committee in its report dated May 31* 195& recommended that
the Renegotiation Act of 1951 be extended to December 31* 1951 and further
mended that t,e following changes be made to the Acts
1. That the statutory floor be raised to £1,000, 000 because the problems
of compliance with renegotiation requirements were burdensome to small
businesses.
2. That the standard article exemption be simplified and classified. It
recommended that a standard commercial article be defined as an article




customarily maintained in stock or covorod 'by established price quotations,
and that at least 35 per cent of the dollar amount of sales of such articles
toy the contractor must be for general civilian industrial or commercial use*
Any article meeting these retirements would aiitociatically qualify as a
standard commercial article without the requirement that the contractor file
an application or obtain approval from the Board. 3h@ Committee also recom-
mended that articles vhich were identical in qy&tj material respect, that is,
an article manufactured of the same or substitute materials and comparable In
price to a standard commercial article, be exempted upon application to and
approval by the Board. Onese identical articles also had to meet the 35 P&r
cent test to be exempted from renegotiation. 2be Board should be required to
take action on an application within three months*
3* That the number of agencies whose contracts were subject to renegotia-
tion be reduced. [At the time of the study the contracts of twenty-one
governmental agencies were subject to renegotiation]*
4. Xhat the act be amenrted to insure that no special emphasis be given
to net worth and aapital employed as contrasted with the other statutory
factors*
5. 2hat the loss carry-forward be liberalized to permit the carrying-for-
ward of losses for two years.
6* 2nat contractors below the statutory floor be exempted from filing
statements of nonapplicability, but be permitted to file at their own option*
7* 2hat the Beaegotiation Board make an annual report to Congress.
6. 2hat subcontracts under a contract with a tax-exempt organisation
should not be automatically exempt from renegotiation.
9* 2hat the permissive exemption from renegotiation for contracts and
subcontracts wholly performed abroad by foreign contractors be made mandatory 7
'Senate Document Bo. 126, op. cit *, pp. 2-if.
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On August 1, 1956 the Act was amended and extended until December 31,
o 8
19I5&. All of the reeonDendatlons of the Joint Oosinittee on Internal Itevenue
Taxation were adopted except the one relating to contracts perforated abroad.
The agencies whose contracts and subcontracts were now subject to renegotia-
tion were restricted to the Department of Defense; the Departments of the
Amy, Bavy, and Air Force; the Maritime Administration; the Federal Maritime
Board; the General Services Administration; and the Atomic Energy Commission.
The President is permitted to include any other agency of the Government ex*
erclsing functions having a direct and immediate connection with the national
defense only during a national emergency proclaimed "by the President or do-
dared "by Congress*
The Amendments Act also provided that a contractor could appeal a
decision of the Tax Court, to the extent subject to review, to the United
States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which Is located the office to
which a contractor made his federal income-tax return. A decision from the
Tax Court can only be appealed on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds.
The termination date of the Benegotiation Act was extended to June 30,
1959 and the national Aeronautics and Space Administration was added as an
agency whose contracts and subcontracts were subject to renegotiation on
September 6, 1958.9
The Renegotiation Act was further amended and the termination date ex-
tended to June 30, 19o2 on July 13, 1959* She loss carry-forward provision
was further liberalized to permit the carrying-forward of losses for five
years, making the carry-forward provision equal to that permitted for Jederal
U. S., Congress, Public Law G?0, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 195$; 70 Stat.
786.
%. S. Congress, Public leoe 65-930, 85th Cong., 2d Sees., 195&; 72
Stat. 1769.
^J. S., Congress, Public less 66-89, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959-
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income-tax puipoces. Provision vas also mad© for the appointment of a General
Counsel of the Renegotiation Board. In addition, the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives were directed to make full and complete studies of the procure
ment policies and practices of the Department of Defense and the Departments
of the Army, Bavy, and Air Force, particularly of the experience of the
departments in the use of various methods of procurement and types of con-
tractual instruments with regard to their effectiveness in achieving reason-
able costs, prices, and profits. The results of the study shall be reported
to the House "by September 30, I960, The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
taxation vas directed to make a full and complete study of the Renegotiation
Act of 1951* as amended, and of the policies and practices of the Renegotia-
tion Board. The report on the results of this study will "be made by March 31,
1961.
The Position of the Proponents of Renegotiation
Ihe Renegotiation Act of 1951> and its continuation, comprise legisla-
tion that has been requested and supported by the President, the executive
departments, particularly the Department of Defense in view of the vast expen-
ditures for military procurement, and some of our senior statesmen who have
been concerned with the prevention of excessive profits. Two of these members
of Congress who have been active in supporting the renegotiation statute are
Senator Francis Case, who introduced the legislation that culminated in the
Renegotiation Act of 19^2, and Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the
Bouse Military Affairs Committee, who introduced the legislation which re-
sulted in the Vinson-Trammel Act in 193^ and the Renegotiation Act of 1951
«
The proponents of renegotiation contend that the high level of defense
spending during the present period of cold war semimobilization and the dif-
ficulties encountered in pricing new and experimental products for which no
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past production and cost experience is available, make renegotiation necessary
to prevent the realization of excessive profits from defense procurement and
to hold down the prices of defense materials. Shis is particularly emphasized
in the area of subcontracting viiere the Defense Department feels that it does
not have adequate controls to prevent the realization of excessive profits
and inflated prices. Basically, the position of the advoeates of renegotia-
tion is that renegotiation is necessary for the following reasons:
1. She high level of defense spending for procurement, the greatest por-
tion of which takes place in areas of little or no competition.
2. The problem vita respect to procurement and pricing in areas of unique
and novel military technologies. In these areas it is often impossible for
the Government to determine, when a procurement contract is made, what con-
stitutes a fair price and for the supplier to accurately forecast his cost.
Most contracts for procurement of this type are made with a contractor best
qualified to produce the equipment and, because of the limited sources of
supply and the experimental nature of the work, the Government is unable to
obtain the price benefits that may result from procurement under normally
competitive conditions.
3» The problem of controlling prices and profits in the area of subcon-
tracts vhich constitute a large part of the dollar amount of expenditures for
defense procurement.
k* The mere existence of renegotiation makes for better and closer pric-
ing policies on the part of contractors and subcontractors, because pricing
risks are one of the factors considered in the determination of excessive
profits.
In testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee in support of
the proposed renegotiation legislation in 1950, Representative Carl Vinson,
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, stated:
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In the first place, renegotiation is not a revenue measure
.... She objective of renegotiation is not to raise revenue,
but to hold prices down.
Because of these facte and circuaistances [increased defense
spending] I think it is incumbent upon us to provide by a broad
coverage of renegotiation an effective means of keeping down
excessive prices and profits*
This is the sole purpose of renegotiation—to hold the prices
down and not permit excessive profits to be zsade.11
In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance during hear-
ings on extension of the Benegotiation Act in 1955, Senator Francis Case pro-
duced several examples of why renegotiation is necessary. Part of Senator
Case's testimony was as follows t
... I have obtained a few sample cases which are current
under the Act of 1951.
One contractor whom I shall designate as contractor A designed
and manufactured electronic connectors and adaptors, largely for
aircraft. Itenegotiable sales were Just under $2 million but they
yielded profits of almost $1 million or actual 50.5 percent of the
business.
Shis contractor's investment In machinery and equipment was
only $14,000 when he began the ye&c, and was only $V3,0QQ at the
end. Yet on that investment—an investment of $k8 ?Q0Q—by the end
of the year he had a profit of $1 million.
Over 90 percent of the work was subcontracted.
Ihe return on net worth of this moaifacturer contractor was
778.9 percent.
Under renegotiation a refund of $750,000 of the $1 million
us.* AtteralaedT12
She President of the United States has been a steadfast advocate cf re-
tegotiation. He reccaEEKsaded extension of the Act In his Budget Messcges to
Congress in 1953 and 1952* l£ a message to Congress in 1955* In support of
the extension of the Bcnegctiation Act, the President stated:
hearings on H.R. ft£46, op . clt . , pp. 12-13.
iJ. 8* f Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings , on E. R.
4904j An Act to Extend the Benegptiation Act of 19*>1 for 2 years , wth Cong.,
1st Sess., 1955* p. 73.
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In spite of major improvements, vhicli ve have achieved in our
contracting and price redetermination operations, there neverthe-
less remains an area in which only renegotiation can he effective
to assure that the United States gets what it needs for defense
at fair prices.
Continuation of the z'enegotiation authority is necessary for
several reasons. Because of the complex nature of modern military
equipment, the lack of experience in producing it, and the frequent
alterations during the life of a contract, it is impossible for the
Government to determine, when the contract is made, what constitutes
a fair price and for the supplier to accurately forecast his costs.
Moreover, because of limited sources of supply in many cases, there
are situations in •which the Government is unable to obtain the price
benefits that accrue from normal competition.
Furthermore, in the interest of broadening and strengthening the
mobilization base, we have encouraged the extensive use of subcon-
tracting. Because the United States has no direct contractual re-
lations with subcontractors, the only protection against unreason-
able prices by them is through the process of renegotiation. 3-3
In a letter to the Speaker of the House supporting and emphasizing the
necessity for an extension of the Renegotiation Act in 1959* the Secretary of
Defense stated:
Defense expenditures are expected under current world conditions
to continue at or somewhat near their present high rate for the fore-
seeable future. Ebr fiscal year 1959 expenditures of the Department
of Defense are estimated to be $40.3 billion. Approximately one-half
of such expenditures represents amounts for the procurement of goods
and services which would be subject to the provisions of the Act.
UXie purpose of renegotiation is to eliminate excessive profits
from defense contracts and subcontracts thereunder. In large-scale
procurement programs involving the purchase of many different types of
specialized items, many of unprecedented nature, past production and
cost experience are not always available for accurately forecasting
the costs of such items. Today, particularly, we are witnessing
rapid developments in the aircraft, missile, and space fields. Pric-
ing policies and contracting techniques of the procuring agencies can-
not guarantee in all cases against excessive profits.
Experience has shown that the renegotiation authority is an effec-
tive method of preventing excessive profits. It has a salutary effect
in contract pricing and has proved particularly effective in the sub-
contracting areas where maintenance of pricing controls is extremely
difficult.1*
13
Ibid., letter reproduced on pp. 1-2.
* U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, on
the General Subject of an Extension of the Renegotiation Act, 86th Cong., 1st
Seas.. 1959, letter reoroduced on o. 2,
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gg TJgWJ 9jt ftftgJBSI Oft ^::ij^^i!^ii:
Bxg reaction of industry to the passage of the asnegotiation Act of
1951 and its subsequent amendments is reminiscent of its reaction to the
World War II statute. One change in the type of reaction is that, vhile moat
industrial representatives did not advocate outright repeal of the World War
II renegotiation lav, but rather sought concessions for their particular in-
dustry, the majority of the representatives of business as evidenced in con-
gressional hearings on extensions of the 1951 Act advocated outright repeal
of the present Renegotiation Act, stating that such controls are not necessary
in peacetime and that the present level of defense procurement is not high
enough to varrant the continuation of this statute. 3ne National Association
of Manufacturers, in response to a questionnaire sent to 250 defense contrac-
tors in 195$ on the subject of renegotiation, received replies that showed
ll*
that the contractors vere overwhelmingly opposed to renegotiation. * However,
it must be kept in mind that those in industry who support the continuation
of renegotiation would probably not testify at congressional hearings to make
their approval known. !Dbat seme industry representatives do support renego-
tiation is evidenced by a statement of the Business Committee on national
Policy of the National Planning Association, an independent, nonpolitlcal,
nonprofit organisation composed of representatives from agriculture, business,
government, labor, and the professions, issued in 1950 in which the Associa-
tion strongly recommended enactment of adequate renegotiation legislation.
Some of the more common of the arguments against the continuation of




national Planning Association, Renegotiation of Defense Contracts,
A Statement of the Business Committee on National Policy.} Special Report So.
28 (Washington: National Planning Association, 1950).
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1. Sons representatives of industry state that existing procurement
techniques, if adequately utilized, are sufficient to prevent excessive prof-
its. The Department of Defense has such a multitude of contract types avail*
able, particularly price redeterminate types, that the proper use of these
will insure close contractor pricing and will prevent a contractor from
realizing excessive profits.
The authority on this subject is the Department of Defense itself.
Defense spokesmen have stated and testified repeatedly that the Department
does not possess contracting techniques that can cope vith all situations,
particularly in the aircraft, space, and missile fields. In these fields
technological advancements are so rapid that a contract usually has to he
amendfrri several times before it is completed. There is no vay of accurately
forecasting costs at the commencement of a contract, or even vher it has been
partially completed. One contractor may benefit substantially by use of in-
novations devised by another contractor in the same field. The Department
feels that such windfall benefits should not accrue to the contractor because
the savings realized in the performance of the contract are not due to the
efficiency of the contractor.
Price redetermination usually deals vith contracts on an individual
basis. So, if costs have been established for one contract and the contractor
then assumes another contract, the fixed costs must then be allocated to each
of the two products to establish the price of each* This price redetermina-
tion on a separate contract basis would involve disagreement as to the proper
allocation to each product. Benegotiation of the contractor's over-all busi-
ness is not concerned vita the allocation of costs to particular product
lines, but vith the total costs incurred in renegotiable business.
Another reason vhy the Defense procurement officer is at a disadvan-
tage in determining costs is that contractors can hire experts in their
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fields and supply them with internal cost and operating data that are not
available to military procurement officers who mist rely on the contractor to
a great extent for cost information. 23ie military procurement officers can-
not attain the ejg>ertlse of professionals "because they are concerned with the
procurement of various tj-pes of items and "oecause they, in accordance with
military career development planning, may hold a procurement billet for onl^
a relatively short time,
Ueports "by the General Accounting Office have shown that present pro-
curement techniques are not always adequate in aosurlng proper pricing and
have shown that some contractors have realized exorbitant profits. An excerpt
from one of these reports on the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Georgia
Division, Marietta, Georgia, issued in May of 1959 > reads as follows:
She report shows that the negotiated target prices included
•mounts lor subcontracted items which were $4,100,600 in excess
of amounts that the contractor knew would be incurred for these
items. Of this amount, $2,oii4,00G was known to the contractor
prior to submission of its proposal, although the proposal stated
that estimated costs of subcontracted items were based on the
most current information available* She remainder of the
$1,266,600 became known to the contractor prior to completion of
negotiations . 33ue lower cost infbrmation was not furnished by
the contractor in negotiations, nor disclosed by Air Ptorce revie
Consequently, unless appropriate adjustments are made, the con-
tractor will receive incentive participation and target profits of
about $1,250,000 because of excessive target estimates rather than
contractor efficiencies .3-7
Without renegotiation the contractors would be allowed to retain these large
profits which were the results of inadequate pricing techniques unless they
were discovered prior to the completion of -toe contract.
2. Another argument proposed by industrial representatives against re-
negotiation is that renegotiation makes for the use of sloppy procurement and
17
'Hearings on the General Subject of an Extension of the Heneffotlft-
tion Actj 19391 off* cit*, p. *fg. Other &xwplftfl pp. hl-k6.
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pricing techniques by defense procurement officers, that is, procurement
officers tend to use renegotiation as a crutch.
HSiis argument does not seen too valid vixen considered in light of the
fact that renegotiation refunds do not revert to the contracting agency, "but
go to miscellaneous receipts in the lEreasury and are not available for re-
expenditure by the contracting agency. When ov^ry service department in the
Department of Defense is vying for a larger slice of the defense dollar, it
does not seem likely that contracting officers vill spend or obligate more
than the mlTrtmra amount necessary Just because the Qovernment vill recoup the
excessive profits of contractors "by renegotiation*
3. Another contention of the opponents of renegotiation is tfcat it dis-
courages efficiency and reduces incentives for low-cost production "by reduc-
ing the profits of contractors engaged in defense work.
The purpose of the Renegotiation Act is to reduce the profits of
defense contractors by amounts that have been determined to be excessive.
"fain is one of the basic purposes of the Act. ISie renegotiation legislation
is the result of years of work at attempting to develop a system of eliminat-
ing excessive profits 3hile still providing incentives for the contractor to
increase efficiency and reduce costs; it is the only profit limiting legisla-
tion which has Incorporated consideration for these items. She statutory
factors to be considered in the determination «f excessive profits include the
efficiency of the contractor, and the Chairmen of the Renegotiation Board
have testified consistently that this factor is given ^roj?9r weight in their
t&terminations. However, an examination of the profit percentages of various
induatries after renegotiation, as shown in hearings before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, indicates that
the percentages for particular industries vary within a y^xy small range
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from year to year. Obis aeons to Indicate either that the efficient contrac-
tor la not being properly rewarded or that the noncfficient contractor is not
"being adequately penalized. The Brewster Committee commented on this small
16
variance for World War H rene;jotiatlon in Its 194o report, fhla, if true,
however, is a defect in the administration of the Act and cannot "be considered
a defect in the legislation.
4. Another argument given ay industry in Disposition to renegotiation is
that the record-keeping required and the dealings with i&e 3oa.;u aire time-
consuming and burdensome, particularly for ssaall businesses. 2he tax func-
tiona in a 'business can normally be left to the accounting departments, be-
cause the tax laws have set forth specific standards; however, the dealings
with the Renegotiation Boards most be handled by top executives of the company,
because renegotiation is a judgment procedure wa& the executives mist justify
profits to the satisfaction of the Boards.
Oils argunent has considerable merit; however, it does not seem that
a business which can be truly classified as a small business is not too ad-
versely affected, because only those contractors who have receipts and
accruals in excess of $1,000,000 a year are sublet to renegotiation under
the present law. In addition, the records which are kept for Federal income*
tax purposes are usually adequate to supply the data required in renegotiate
proceedings, unless the business manufactures a diverse line of product
only some of which are subject to renegotiation. In this case the contractor
must maintain records that are good enough to alloy the proper allocation of
coats, a practice that may not normally be followed in a small organization*
OongroBs has realized the difficulties encountered In the segregation of costs
and profits, particularly where standard commercial article manufacturing Is
Involved and has attempted to lessen the burden on business by various
Senate Heport So, hMO, Part 2, pp« cit», p. 7»
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amendments to the standard commercial article and standard commercial service
It oust be npwabered, too, that the costs Incurred in meeting rene-
gotiation requirements can "be considered as expense items by a business.
Consequently, and ultimately, toe costs of the extra record-keeping required
for renegotiation are borne by the Uoveracwut. J£f as experience indicates,
renegotiation does have a salutary effect on contractor pricing policies and
eliminates excess profits,, then the expense involved in meeting renegotiation
accounting requirements is outweighed by the benefits derived from the exist-
ence of the statute.
5. Industry also contends that the Renegotiation Boards arrive at their
determinations in an arbitrary manner which defies rational analysis or
retrospective review by the appelate courts*
The Benegotiation Act sets forth seven factors that aaist be consider-
ed by the Board in arriving at its determination of excessive profits. She
entire statute is based on the fact that the determination of what constitutes
excessive profits is a judgment procedure in which all the variables that
affect different types of businesses are considered—no fixed percentages of
any sort are to be used as standards against vLich profits are measured* Bae
seven statutory factors are to be considered and weighed against each individ-
ual contractor's performance by the Board in their consideration of a case.
3h& Chairman of the Benegotiation Board have testified consistently at con-
gressional hearings that the factors are properly considered in their deter-
minations*
What the contractors would like is for the Board to be more specific
in their statements to the contractors as to hov much weight has been attached
to the specific factors, a procedure which the Board states that it feels it
cannot follow because no specific weight is attached to any particular factor.
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Banagotiation is an over-all retrospective review of a contractor's perform-
ance* and the amount of profits determined by the Board to be excessive is
stated In a total dollar amount and not as a percentage of sales or net worth.
The primary benefit derived from the renegotiation procedure as con-
trasted to other profit limitation systems is that a determination of -what
constitutes excessive profits does depend on judgment and a consideration of
all factors that are involved in the performance of contracts^ and is not an
inflexible procedure that will work hardships on a "business under certain cir-
cumstances and permit excessive i>rcfits under other circumstances*
6« A^othe^ argument proposed "by industr; • isontatives is that the
cost of renegotiation to the Government and to the economy is excessive.
As of June 30, 1959. the ftenegotiation Soard had made refund deter-
minations of excessive profits amounting to $7^3,^12, 931 under the provisions
19
of the 1951 Act. In addition, voluntary refunds and price reductions—
-
these voluntary refunds and price reductions are not connected with price in-
ductions made under price redeteriainable contracts—by contractors amounted
to $1,033,062,kGL, !Ehe total of these two items is $1,817,675,332. After
allowance for tax credit in the amount of $1,136,800,000 and expenses incurred
in the administration of renegotiation of $2,6^6,546, total net recoveries of
the Board cumulative to June 30, 1959 amounted to $670,218,764. Additional
refund determinations of $45, 633,402 as of June 30, 1959* had not yet been
made final. While the net refund figure cannot he taken as an absolute
criterion for determining whether the cost of renegotiation is excessive be-
cause 00 data are available on the contractors' costs in coimplying with rene-
gotiation requirements, it does show that excessive profits do exist in
defense contracts.
HJ. S., asnegotiation Board, Fourth Annual Bgport (Washington: u\ S.
Government Printing Office, 1959 )• All refund data in this discussion obtain-
ed from pp. 5-13 of the report.
ft to EU
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Department of Lofense representatives have testified and stated
repeatedly that renegotiation has a salutary effect on pricing; what the
pricing of defense procurement would be without renegotiation is conjecture,
but in view of past experience with renege m. it seeas logical to opine
that it does hold down the prices of defense materials. When defense contract
profits are considered in view of the earlier inentioned General Accounting
Office reports, it seems quite evident that renegotiation does have a fertile
field in which to make its effects felt and it seems only logical that one of
the effects of renegotiation is more reasonable* pricing by the contractor.
It must be remembered that renegotiation is not a revenue raising
process and that the effects of renegotiation cannot be neasured by the amount
of refunds alone. Even if the renegotiation procedure resulted in an apparent
bookkeeping loss, it would be desirable to maintain renegotiation to insure
more reasonable pricing by the contractor. The Chairman of the Bsnegotiation
Board, 2homas Coggeshall, testified before the House Comoittee on Ways and
Means in 195$:
Benegotiaticn fun nly V . Uux» eivcessive profits,
but to prevent them. It is common knowledge that the mere existence
of the renegotiat .fcbority frequently induces contractors to
price more closely than they otherwise would, and thus avoid accru-
ing excessive profits* 2hi& process of aelf-renagotiatlon is the
most significant and Important by-product of renegotiation* gJSba
resultant dollar savings to the QetVrauant are iiicaicalable.
7. Another complaint of industry representatives is that the time re*
quired for completion of the renegotiation procedure is excessive and that a
company does not know its financial standing until its completion.
The Bsnegotiation Board is permitted only one year from the date that
the contractor files his report in which to commence renegotiation proceedings
d. 6., Congress, House, Oommit-uee on Ways and ideans, Hearings^ On
Extension of the flenegotiation Act, 35th Cong., 2d Sees., 195^, P« ^3«
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and two years from the date of commencement in which to complete the proceed-
lags. Some of the reasons for delay beyond this period are: (1) delinquencies
by contractors, (2) requests for time extensions from contractors, and (3)
delays encountered In the conclusion of price redeterml,nation proceedings "be-
on
tween contractors and procurement authorities. A period of from one to
three years is of course still a Ions time for a company to be uncertain as
to its financial position* however, it does seem logical that after years of
experience with renegotiation proceedings a company should be able to esti-
mate approximately how it will fare before the Board and to establish reserves
for the amount that it estimates it must refund. One of the industry witnesses
in the Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means in 19^3 stated
that at that time he had had enough experience with the renegotiation process
op
to approximately forecast how jaich he would be called upon to refund.
An Appeal to the Tax Court of the United States, of course, increases
the time required for the completion of renegotiation, but this action is
beyond the basic renegotiation determination of the amounts of profits that
have been determined to be excessive.
~Tourth Annual Beport of the flaaegotiation Doard, op. cit . f p. Y«
^Hearings on H.H« 232k t H«R. 2696, and H.R. 3015 , op. clt . f p. 5&

CHAPTER IV
THE ADMINISTRATION OF RENEGOTIATION
The 19^2 Act
The Renegotiation Act of \9^2, as amended, vested the responsibility
for renegotiation in the heads of the departments or agencies vhose contracts
were subject to the Act, the Secretaries of War, navy, and Treasury; the
Chairman of the Maritime Commission^ and the Boards of Directors of the four
RFC subsidiaries, who had the power to redelegate the authority to administer
the Act. Consequently, five different Price Adjustment Boards were estab-
lished, one in each of the named departments, which were organized differently
and did not use uniform methods or procedures in the administration of the
Act.
War Department
The most extensive and intricate organization established to adminis-
ter the renegotiation process was established in the Department of War. The
Secretary of War delegated, his powers to the Under Secretary, who in turn
delegated the majority of them to the War Department Price Adjustment Board.
The Board was established within the Renegotiation Division, which had been
created by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces as a staff division
under the supervision of the Director of Material. The Chairmen and members
of the Board were appointed by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces,
with the approval of the Under Secretary. The Chairman of the Board also




A Price Adjustment Section was established in each of the Technical
Services of the Array and in the Array Air Forces. These Services established
subordinate District Price Adjustment Sections at the various procurement
centers* The number of Price Adjustment Sections in operation at one time
varied, but generally was around forty-five.
The War Department Price Adjustment Board functioned primarily as a
policy-making and reviewing agency, although it did handle difficult or
complicated cases. The Board approved all recommendations and settlements
proposed by the Technical Services. The Assignments Section of the ftenego-
tiation Division was responsible for determining which companies were renego-
tiate. Contractors were not required to file with the Board; the informa-
tion was obtained by checking income-tax returns, company annual reports,
from the Securities and Exchange Commission, procurement officers, and other
sources of business data. After the Section had determined that a particular
contractor was subject to the Act he was assigned to the Service which had the
preponderant interest in Use production of the contractor involved. The Ser-
vice further assigned his case to the District Price Adjustment Section loca-
ted nearest the contractor.
A Cost-Analysis Section attached to the District Price Adjustment
Section obtained financial and production data from the contractor and made
an analysis for the renegetiator assigned to the case. The information was
normally obtained by correspondence. Sometimes visits were made to the con-
tractor's plant, but audits were not normally conducted. After the renegotla-
tor had familiarized himself with the analysis and reached some preliminary
conclusions, he met with the company officials for a discussion of their case.
Subsequent to the conference the renegotiator met with the Chief of the Sec-
tion and they Jointly determined the amount of excessive profits. This deci-
sion was then conveyed to the company officials. After the contractor had
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•greed to the terms of the decision, the tentative agreement was subject to
the approval of the Chief of the Service. After his approval it was submitted
to the War Department Price Adjustment Board for approval. All agreements
vere submitted to all departments interested in a case for signature before
the agreement became final. If neither the District Price Adjustment Section
nor the Service Price Adjustment Section could reach an agreement with the
contractor, the case vas referred to the Board for a unilateral determination.
Early in 19^3 the District Price Adjustment Sections were given
authority to enter into agreements with contractors in cases involving profits
of less than $5,000,000 and the Service Price Adjustment Sections were given
the same authority for cases concerning profits of less than $10,000,000.
Unilateral determination authority was retained by the Board.
Navy Department
!Ehe Navy Department's organization for the administration of renego-
tiation remained centralized to a much greater extent than that of the War
Department. Ihe Secretary of the Navy delegated his powers to the Under
Secretary who established the Havy Department Price Adjustment Board in the
Office of Procurement and Material. Biis Board established policy and review-
ed all renegotiation actions. In addition to the main Board in Washington,
a section of the Board was located in New York, and two regional boards were
established, one in Chicago and one in San Francisco. All of the Boards con-
ducted renegotiation proceedings. 5he Cost and Audit Division of the Office
of Procurement and Material determined which contractors were subject to re-
negotiation, using information-obtaining procedures similar to those used by
the Army. Preliminary financial and production information was obtained by
correspondence from contractors who were found to be subject to the Act. If
the preliminary data indicated that a contractor might be realizing excessive
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profits, a panel of auditors—composed of partners and members of public
accounting firms vho voluntarily served on a part-time basis—was assigned to
the contractor to assist him in preparation of data required by the Board.
These data were reviewed and analyzed by the Cost and Audit Division for the
Board which handled the renegotiation. The contractor was invited to appear
before the Board to which he had been assigned. After the conference, the
Board determined the amount of excessive profits and informed the contractor.
After an agreement was reached with a contractor, the terms of the agreement
were forwarded to the Under Secretary of the Havy for approval, via the
Departmental Board in the case of the regional boards. She Under Secretary
determined the amounts of excessive profits in those cases in which the boards
could not come to an agreement with the contractor.
Maritime Commission
The Chairman of the Maritime Commission established a Price Adjust-
ment Board composed of four members. The Board was assigned a staff of accountj-
ants and analysts who obtained all preliminary data and prepared reports for
the use of the Board. Two of the Board members conducted the renegotiation
proceedings with representatives of the contractors in Washington. The other
two members constituted a review body to assure adherence to policies and
procedures.
Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury delegated his powers to the Director of
Procurement who established a Treasury Department Price Adjustment Board in
Washington. A staff of accountants and analysts obtained and developed pre-
liminary data for the use of the Board. The entire Board participated in the





The Boards of Directors of the Defense Plant Corporation, the Metals
Reserve Company, the Defense Supplies Corporation, and the Robber Reserve
Company delegated all of the authority conferred on them to a joint board
known as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Price Adjustment Board* The
RFC Board was located in Washington and functioned in a manner similar to that
of the Maritime Commission Board.
Coordination of Administration
In January 1<&3 the Secretaries of the Departments cross-delegated
authority so that the department conducting renegotiation with a contractor
vho did business with several departments could sign an agreement that was
binding on all departments, thus eliminating a period of delay in the comple-
tion of the proceedings.
In order to bring about a greater degree of uniformity and coordina-
tion in the procedures and policies of the various departments, the Joint
Price Adjustment Board was established late in 19^3 by mutual agreement among
the Secretaries. The Board was composed of one representative from each
agency and one from the War Production Board. It was delegated the authority
to establish rules for all departments, to assign contractors for renegotia-
tion, and to interpret and apply regulations. 'Ihe Assignments and Statistics
Branch of the Army Renegotiation Division was authorized to act for the
Board in the assignment of contractors to appropriate Departments.
The 1943 Act
The Renegotiation Act of 1S&3 made the contracts of War Shipping Ad-
ministration subject to the Act, created the War Contracts Price Adjustment




The Administrator of the War Shipping Administration established a
Price Adjustment Board in Dew York. It operated like the Treasury Department
Board.
The War Contracts Price Adjustment Board was vested with the statutory
responsibility for conducting the administration of the Renegotiation Act of
1943 • Through the use of its power of delegation of authority it delegated
the renegotiation operations to the Departments and retained for Itself the
1functions relating to policy-making, the publishing of regulations, the
granting of exemptions, and the review of Departmental determinations. The
War Contracts Price Adjustment i3oard authorized the Assignments and Statistics
Branch of the War Department's renegotiation Division to make all assignments,
reaasignments, and cancellations of assignments. The internal organization
for renegotiation within the Departments remained the same as for the 1942
Act.
Contractors were required to file a "Standard Form of Contractor's
Report" with the Assignments and Statistics iaranch on or before the first day
of the fourth month following the close of their fiscal year. The Assign-
ments and Statistics Branch usually assigned renegotiable contractors to the
Department or Service having the predominant Interest in the contractors'
renegotiable business. At times the assignments were made on the basis of
industry or product classification to the Service or Department having ac-
quired specialized experience in such classification.
Renegotiation had to be commenced within one year after the date of
filing by the contractor, or the liabilities of the contractor with respect
to renegotiation for that fiscal year were discharged. If the Board did not
TJ« S., Code of Federal Regulations , Title 32, Chapter XIV, 19kh
Supplement, Renegotiation Regulations .
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come to an agreement with the contractor or Issue a unilateral order within
one year after the date of the commencement of renegotiation, the liabilities
of the contractor ceased for that fiscal year except for a shoving of fraud,
malfeasance, cr willful misrepresentation of a material fact.
05i3 contractor was notified Toy registered mail with reasonable notice
as to the time and place of a conference with respect to renegotiation* The
contractor could present any information he deemed pertinent to the renego-
tiation of his profits and was to "be given every possible assistance and
consideration with respect to the technical requirements of renegotiation.
The Departmental Board© of the Departments were authorized tc make
final agreements and issue unilateral orders in case an agreement cGuld not
be reached with the contractor. One War Contracts Price Adjustment Board was
notified of each unilateral decision and could review the determination on
its own motion within sixty days. A contractor who disagreed with a uni-
lateral order could appeal to the Board within sixty days for a review. If
the Board took no action the order became final after sixty days. If the
Board reviewed a case and issued an order or made an agreement, the order or
agreement became final immediately. A contractor could request a statement
with respect to his renegotiation within the thirty days following the receipt
of a final agreement or unilateral order.
A contractor who disagreed with the determination in a final uni-
lateral order could petition the Tax Court of the United States for a rede-
termination of the amount of excessive profits. The proceedings before the
Tax Court irere de novo and. the determination of the Court was final. A peti-
tion to the Tax Court did not stay an order of the Board and the Secretaries
of the Departments, to whom had been delegated the authority, could begin




The Renegotiation Act of 1$&3 conferred the responsibility for admin-
istration of renegotiation, with the power of delegation, on the Secretary of
Defense. To carry out this responsibility the Secretary of Defense establish-
ed the Military Renegotiation Policy and Bevies/ Board, consisting of three
members j established the Armed Services Renegotiation Board, consisting of
three Divisions—the Army Renegotiation Division, the Navy Renegotiation
Division, and the Air force Renegotiation Division—of five men each) and
2published the Military Renegotiation Regulations. The- five members who
served on the Divisional Boards were appointed by the Secretaries of the
respective departments who also designated one of the members to serve as
Chairman of the Board. The Military Renegotiation Policy and Review Board
consisted of the three Chairmen of the Divisional Boards.
The Military Renegotiation Policy and Review Board was given the
authority to make regulations, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Defense; to exempt contracts by classes and types; to audit the records and
books of contractors subject to the Act; and to review the determinations of
the Divisional Boards. !Ehe Military Divisional Boards, all located In Wash-
ington, were responsible for the actual conduct of the renegotiation proceed-
ings with contractors. They were given the authority to make agreements with
contractors and to issue unilateral orders to contractors if they could not
agree on the amount of excessive profits realized by the contractors, subject
to the approval of the Policy and Review Board.
Contractors subject to the Act were required to file the "Standard
Form of Contractors Report" vith the Military Renegotiation Policy and Review
u. S., Code of Federal Regulations , Title 32, Chapter XIVA, 1951*
Military Renegotiation Regulations under the Renegotiations Act of 19&> *
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Board on or before the last day of the fifth month following the close of
the contractor's fiscal year* Assignments for renegotiation were made by the
Policy and Review Board to the proper Division.
One Divisional Board notified the contractor by registered nail of
the time and place the proceedings would commence, and normally sent him a
"Contractor's Information and Work Sheet" to assist him in preparing the in-
formation required for the renegotiation of his profits. 03ae renegotiation
proceedings were conducted in Washington. A contractor was invited to appear
before the Board and submit any Information that concerned his production and
profits. After the Divisional Board came to an agreement as to the amount of
excessive profits with the contractor, the agreement was signed by the con-
tractor and submitted, unsigned by the Board, to the Policy and Review Board
for review to ascertain that all policies were being complied with. She
Policy and Review Board had sixty days in which to indicate approval, in which
case the agreement was returned to the Division Board for signature, or in
which to reject the agreement and begin a new proceeding. At the end of sixty
days the agreement became final if no action had been taken. If the Division
Board could not come to an agreement with the contractor it was authorized
to issue a unilateral order informing the contractor of the amount of profits
it had determined to be excessive. She orders became final at the end of
sixty days unless the Military Renegotiation Policy and Review Board initiated
a review on its own motion, or the contractor appealed to the Policy and Review
Board for a mandatory redetermination. If the order was reviewed by the PoUey
and Review Board on its own motion and the Board issued a new order, the new
order became final after sixty days. If the Board reviewed a unilateral order
in response to an appeal from the contractor and issued a new order, the new
order became final Immediately. If the Policy and Review Board came to an
agreement with the contractor in a case which had been the subject of a
Division unilateral order, the agreement became final after sixty days.
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The Act provided no statute of limitations for either the commence-
ment or termination of renegotiation proceedings* However, the Secretary of
Defense in the Military Renegotiation Regulations stated that all proceedings
should he begun and completed within fifteen months following the filing of a
contractor's report.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments were delegated the
authority to collect refunds of the amounts of profits which had been deter-
mined to be excessive* Refunds not made within two years after the close of
the renegotiation proceedings, or the contractors renegotiated fiscal year,
were subjected to an interest charge of 6 per cent per annum*
The contractor could petition the Tax Court of the United States for
a redetermination within ninety days after an order became final if he was
not satisfied with the findings of the renegotiation authorities*
The Renegotiation Act of 1951
Organization
The Renegotiation Act of 1951 created an independent board in the
executive branch composed of five men appointed by the President to administer
renegotiation* One of the members is appointed Chairman of the Board by the
President* The Board has the power to delegate some of its authority to any
other governmental agency except to those persons, other than the Secretary of
Defense, who are engaged in the behalf of any Department in the making of con*
tracts for supplies and services, or in the supervision of such activity,
except that the Secretaries of Departments subject to the Act may be authoriz-
ed and directed to eliminate profits determined to be excessive by the Rene-
gotiation Board* The Renegotiation Board, located in Washington, determines
3policies, publishes regulations, makes assignments, reviews Regional Board
*TJ. S., Code of Federal Regulations , Title 32, Chapter XIVB, 195^,
The Renegotiation Board Regulations Under the 1951 Act *

determinations, and grants permissive exemptions. It has, at the present
time, three Begional Boards which conduct actual renegotiation proceedings.
Regional Boards are located in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Hew York.
Conduct of Renegotiation
A contractor is required to file a "Standard Form of Contractor's
Report" with respect to his renegotiable "business for a fiscal year on or be-
fore the first day of the fifth month after the end of his fiscal year, with
the Renegotiation Board in Washington. A contractor whose renegotiable busi-
ness is below the statutory floor
—
$1,000,000—may file or not, as he chooses.
Hhe benefit a contractor below the floor obtains from filing a "Statement of
Won-Applicability" is that his profits will be foreclosed to investigation
after the passage of one year after filing by the statute of limitations.
All of the reports are examined by the Renegotiation Board. In cases where
the profits were obviously not excessive, no further action is taken and the
contractor is cleared for that year. All other cases are assigned to the
Regional Boards on a geographic basis.
The Regional Board must commence renegotiation by mailing a registered
letter to the contractor within one year after the receipt of the contractor's
report by the Renegotiation Board. If proceedings are not commenced within
one year the liabilities of the contractor are discharged and he is no longer
subject to renegotiation for that year. !Bae Begional Boards have the author-
ity to make agreements with the contractor in respect to the amount of exces-
sive profits in cases involving renegotlable profits of $600,000 or less. If
no agreement can be reached with the contractor, the Begional Board issues a
unilateral order to the contractor directing the refund of excessive profits.
The Renegotiation Board may review the order on its own motion within ninety
days, or the contractor may appeal to the Renegotiation Board for a redeter-
mination within ninety days. If no appeal or review are made within ninety
days after the issuance of an order, the order becomes final. If the Board
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reviews a case, or decides not to review a case, tbte order to the contractor
'becomes final as of the date of the smiling of the notice not to review or the
date of the new order.
In cases involving renegotiable profits above ^00,000, the determina-
tions of the Rsgional Boards must "be approved by the Renegotiation Board be-
fore agreements can be executed. If the Regional Board's determination is
not acceptable to the Renegotiation Board or the contractor, the case is re-
assigned to the Renegotiation Board for further processing which results in
either an agreement \ r±ih the contractor or a unilateral order by the Renego-
tiation Board. One agreement or order becomes final as of the date that it
is mailed to the contractor.
An agreement must be reached or a unilateral order issued within two
years after the date of the commencement of the renegotiation proceedings.
If the cases are not completed within two years, the liabilities of the con-
tractor with respect to renegotiation for the fiscal year under consideration
are discharged. The case may not be reopened except for a subsequent finding
of fraud on the part of the contractor.
Appeal of Ranegotiatlon Board Orders
If the contractor does not agree with a decision of the Renegotiation
Board he may file a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court of the
United States within ninety days after an order becomes final. Upon such a
filing, the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the amount of
excessive profits of the contractor and the determination of the Tax Court as
to the amount of excessive profits cannot be reviewed or redetermined by any
other court or agency. The proceeding before the Tax Court is a proceeding
de novo . The Court can find an amount of excessive profits equal to, less
than, or more than the amount found by the Renegotiation Board.

16
The contractor may further appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which 1b located the office to which the contractor
noises hit income-tax return. The appeal can only be made vith respect to
questions of law, .jurisdiction, or procedure* not on questions of the amount
of excessive profits as determined by the Tax Court.
The order of the Benegotiation Board xaay be stayed during an appeal,
if the contractor files a bond with the Tax Court; the amount of bond is set
by the Court. If the amount of the bond filed is less than the amount sub-
sequently determined to be due the United States as a refund of excessive
profits, the contractor pays h p*r cent annual interest on the difference up
to a maximum of 12 per cent. If the contractor does not file a bond and
makes the refund in the amount ordered by the Renegotiation Board -while
appealing to the Tax Court for a redetermination, the amount collected vhich
is in excess of the amount subsequently determined by the Tax Court to be ex-
cessive is refunded to the contractor vith h per cent annual Interest up to a
aaximum of 12 per cent.
Recovery of Excessive Profits
The Benegotiation Board has delegated the authority to eliminate ex-
cessive profits, or collect refunds from the contractors for the account of
the United States in the amounts determined by the Board, to the Secretaries
of the agencies whose contracts are subject to the Act. Recoveries of exces-
sive profits can be effected in the following ways:
1. By reduction in the amounts payable to a contractor under terms of
contracts outstanding.
2. By withholding the amount from amounts otherwise due the contractor.
. By directing any government contractor or subcontractor or any
government agency to withhold for the account of the United States tha
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amount of excessive profits from any amounts otherwise due to contractors or
subcontractors having excessive profits to be eliminated and to pay these
amounts to the United States.
k. Ey recovering from a contractor or subcontractor by repayment, credit,
or suit any amounts of excessive profits already paid the contractors*
Bie funds recovered go into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts




Vlnson-Traianel Act and Merchant Marine Act
The profit limitations of the Vinson-Transnel Act and the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 have "been suspended for over seventeen of the last twenty
years. The functions for which this legislation was enacted have "been per-
formed by the Renegotiation Acts. In the event the Renegotiation Act of 1951
is terminated the provisions of the two Acts would again become effective.
These profit limitations are basically cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost
type of limitations with all the defects of this type of contract. The limitaf
tions are inflexible and there is no recognition of contractor performance,
risk, efficiency, or any of the other factors considered in renegotiation.
The application of a percentage limitation does not take into consideration
the variation in the performance and contribution of individual contractors
due to requirements as to capital, skills, and work; nature of the articles
produced; source of capital and facilities; or any other individual difference!
between contractors. In addition, the limitations apply only to shipbuilding
and aircraft procurement. While the volume of expenditures in these two areas
is large, the limitations do not apply to expenditures for the development and
production of new weapons systems and technological innovations.
Therefore it would seem that the time has come to repeal the Vinson-
irammel Act and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, particularly if renegotiation





A study of the history of renegotiation shows that it has bean effec-
tive in large degree in accomplishing the purposes for which it was enacted*
Although some areas of excessive profits during World War II have been ex-
posed, industry on the whole has been given a "dean bill of health" as com-
pared to the reports of profiteering during prior wars.
However, renegotiation during peacetime takes on a different aspect
from wartime renegotiation. iJuring World War II over 35 P®r cent of the gross
national product was devoted to defense ', at the present time defense expendi-
tures for procurement account for approximately 5 per cent of the gross
national product. Although expenditures for defense procurement are a
relatively small portion of the gross national product, the dollar amount is
greater than that expended for mobilization and defense preparedness during
any previous periods of peace. Studies and investigations have shown that
opportunity exists for the realization of large profits by defense contractors
and subcontractors because of the difficulty of pricing new military weapons
and weapons systems which are constantly undergoing change due to techno-
logical advancement and the somewhat nebulous contractual relationships
between the government and subcontractors.
Opportunity for the realization of excessive profits does not reside
with large contractors alone. Ihe report on renegotiation published by the
Special Senate Committee to Investigate the national Defense Program stated
tliat Mt per cent of the companies in the $100,000 to $500,000 profits per
1
year bracket made excessive profits during World War II. 2he reports of the
^negotiation Board established by the 1951 Act have reported a smaller per-
centage. The First Annual Beport of the Renegotiation Board showed that
Senate Beport HO. khO, Part 2, op. cit *, pp. 10-11.
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cumulative to June 30, 1935, of the total amount of profits that had boon
determined to be excessive 15. 7 per cent represented excessive profits
realized by companies doing lees than $1,000,000 of business a year. The same
report shoved that during the fiscal year ended June 30, 195&, of the total
amount of profits determined to have been excessive, this category represented
only 6.2 per cent. The report also stated:
The circumstance that the smaller cases represented larger
percentages of total determinations prior to June 30, 1955* was
due in large part to the fact that in the original act, the
statutory floor was $250,000 for most contractors.
3
The statutory floor was raised to $500,000 for fiscal years ending after
June 30, 1953 and to $1,000,000 for fiscal years ending after June 30, 1956
to lessen the administrative burden on the Renegotiation Board and small con-
tractors. The evidence indicates that excessive profits were and are being
made by small contractors. Size alone should not be a criterion for per-
mitting contractors to retain excessive profits.
Renegotiation functions to insure that the government and the tax*
payer are receiving full value for each dollar spent during a period of semi-
mobilization and high defense procurement expenditures. In some procurement
areas sufficient competition among producers exists to insure the government
of fair and competitive prices. However, in other areas of defense procure-
ment, particularly in the areas of procurement in the space, aircraft, and
missile fields little or no competition exists to assure the government of a
proper price. The lack of competition, and consequent inadequate pricing is
not restricted to these areas of procurement* A spokesman for the Department
of Defense testified in 1959 that:
u. S., Renegotiation Board, First Annual Report (Washington: U. S»
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 6.
3Ibid.

With respect to contracts or subcontracts which have been
made the subject of competitive bidding where an award has been
made to a low bidder among three or more responsive competitive
bidders, it is the position of the Department of defense that
such competition in the area of military items, as distinguished
from commercial articles, does not guarantee against excessive
profits.
Prices for such items are not controlled by competitive forces
of the commercial market as in the case of standard commercial
articles which are sold elsewhere than in the Department of Defense
largely, and the cost estimates upon which bids are based are not
necessarily accurate in view of subsequent developments such as
increased production and the various types of changes in the state
of the Industry which may come about in these new and extraordinary
fields. 1*
In view of the facts that renegotiation does have a salutary effect on pricing
and that the present rate of defense expenditures is expected to continue for
the foreseeable future, the renegotiation legislation should be made per-
manent law. Representative Carl Vinson made this proposal to the House Ways
and Means Committee in 1959s "?&•• Chairman, I propose that Section 1 of
the bill be amended to reenact the Renegotiation Act of 1951 as permanent
law without an expiration date."^
One statute could be simplified and enlarged in scope if all con-
tractors who held defense-end contracts were made contingently subject to
renegotiation if their receipts and accruals from the performance of these
contracts aggregated more than h>100,000 annually, but would be exempt unless
affirmatively designated. Ihe agencies and departments who are designated in
the Act would then have the burden of designating those areas, product lines,
or product classes in which insufficient competition exists or In which dif-
ficulty exists in obtaining cost and price data when a contract is made. She
procurement areas or contractors to be designated as subject to renegotiation,
hearings on the General Subject of_An Extension of the Renegotiation
Act, 1959* op. cit., p. Ik.
""
^Ibid., p. 1 .
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such as new and unique weapons or certain subcontractors, could be recom-
mended to the Renegotiation Board by the agencies and departments for inclu-
sion among those to be subject to renegotiation. One Renegotiation Board
should, under this plan, report to Congress annually on the status of rene-
gotiation coverage. Congress could, of course, mandatorily exempt contracts
for certain items, such as those for agricultural commodities. If it is felt
that this would give an administrative agency too much authority, Congress
could establish or appoint a continuing subcommittee to approve the recom-
mendations of the departments or agencies. She product lines to be subject
to renegotiation could be changed as operating and procurement experience,
economic conditions, and world political conditions dictated. If competitive
conditions develop in certain procurement areas, these areas could be dropped
from those subject to renegotiation, or if the cold war became hot all defense
contracts could immediately be made subject to renegotiation.
A revision along these lines would provide for greater flexibility
and would remove the administrative burden of renegotiation from those areas
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